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Abstract
This thesis analyzes policy measures taken to curb the private sector credit
growth in the period 2003-08. The thesis evaluates the excessiveness of the
credit development in the CEE with respect to macroeconomic fundamentals.
Based on the results, menu of policy options to counter adverse effects of the
credit boom is reviewed. The analysis is based on a survey performed on eleven
central banks in the region. The findings reveal high intensity of policy inter-
vention: altogether 82 measures were taken in CEE in the period. Deriving
from the country experiences, the thesis argues that in order to eliminate ad-
verse impacts, policy measures should include combination of monetary and
prudential tools with special emphasis on domestic environment and role of
foreign banks in the CEE region.
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Abstrakt
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2003 azˇ 2008 s c´ılem omezit u´veˇrovy´ r˚ust v soukrome´m sektoru. Pra´ce hod-
not´ı nadmeˇrny´ vy´voj u´veˇr˚u v regionu strˇedn´ı a vy´chodn´ı Evropy s ohledem
na makroekonomicke´ fundamenty. Na za´kladeˇ vy´sledk˚u analy´zy posuzujeme
mozˇna´ opatrˇen´ı proti neprˇ´ıznivy´m efekt˚um nadmeˇrne´ho u´veˇrove´ho r˚ustu. Analy´za
je zalozˇena na pr˚uzkumu jedena´cti centra´ln´ıch bank regionu a jej´ı vy´sledky
prokazuj´ı vysokou intenzitu intervenc´ı: v pr˚ubeˇhu sledovane´ho obdob´ı bylo v
regionu prˇijato celkem 82 opatrˇen´ı. Na za´kladeˇ zkusˇenost´ı vybrany´ch zemı´
docha´z´ıme k za´veˇru, zˇe opatrˇen´ı by meˇla zahrnovat kombinaci moneta´rn´ıch i
prudencˇn´ı na´stroj˚u se specia´ln´ım d˚urazem na doma´c´ı prostrˇed´ı a roli zahranicˇn´ıch
bank v regionu strˇedn´ı a vy´chodn´ı Evropy.
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Proposed topic From credit growth to credit crunch: Analysis of re-
sponses to credit development in CEE region
Topic characteristics The aim of the thesis is to discuss the credit develop-
ment in emerging markets, in particular in the CEE region. In the pre-crisis
years region witnessed a rapid credit growth that was subject to extensive de-
bates. Scholars and policymakers questioned whether the rapid credit growth
is a sign of a fundamentally based “catching-up” effect or an early warning in-
dicator. As a result they attempted to analyze the risks and develop adequate
instruments in order to limit the credit growth.
In the thesis, I would like to focus on the assessment of the instruments
applied in the CEE region in the pre-crisis years. Furthermore, I will also try
to deal with the development in the crisis period, i.e. whether and why these
instruments have been abandoned.
The thesis is to consist of two main parts: theoretical and empirical. In
the theoretical one I would like to analyze the credit growth instruments both
from global and country-specific perspective. The empirical part will be based
on the valuation of the efficiency of the instruments via event-study method.
Methodology The theoretical part of the thesis will be mainly based on a
literature published before the credit crunch. Firstly, there has been substantial
research regarding the determinants of the rapid credit growth in CEE region.
Hence the key task of the first part is to answer the question whether the rapid
credit growth can be considered to be fundamentally based or not.
Secondly, Enoch and Otker-Robe (2007) aˆ€“ an IMF volume published
as a result of conference of CEE jointly held by IMF and National Bank of
Romania discusses not only the risks but more also the instruments used in
order to prevent from the rapid credit growth before 2005. Next, the credit
crunch part will be primarily based on the country-specific IMF FSAP reports.
Furthermore, the responses of the national authorities will be collected in
form of a questionnaire. Simple questionnaire will attempt to collect the most
essential data about the specific instruments and their timing.
The empirical part will be based on the event-study analysis of credit data
time series. Event study method is an econometric technique used to estimate
and draw inferences about the impact of an event in a particular period. In this
case the event is the introduction of a new instrument. Knowing the timing of
implementation, it can be possible to show potential effect of the instrument.
Credit data will be retrieved from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)
and adequate questionnaire responses.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The experience of Central and Eastern European countries over the years 2003-
2008 is extraordinary in many ways. The credit developments is no doubt an
evidence. Until the eve of global financial crisis, majority of the economies
witnesses an unprecedented credit boom. With the impact of the crisis, the
boom was suddenly discontinued and turned into a credit crunch.
This thesis tracks the period from credit growth to credit crunch (2003 -
2008) with a special focus on policy measures taken to alleviate the adverse
effects of the credit growth. Credit growth is an inherently beneficial process.
Its revivals are seen as sings of healthy banking system and confidence in the
economy. Moreover, in case of CEE region the dynamics was also justified by
catching-up with Western Europe. On the other hand, excessive credit growth
increases imbalances and can contribute to amplifying vulnerabilities of the
financial system.
In order to analyze the policy responses, we first need understand the nature
of the phenomenon. In the first part the thesis we look closely at the issue: How
much credit growth is too much? The answer will be provided by combination
of concise literature findings and panel FE-OLS model that compares actual
credit-to-GDP developments with derived long-run equilibrium levels.
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the policy responses to the credit
developments. In particular, it aims to answer a set of questions: What in-
struments were used the most? How effective were they? What were the
implementation challenges? How did agents circumvent the measures?
The main contribution of this thesis is that the evaluation is performed
upon the results of a survey that was conducted on eleven central banks in CEE.
Having the survey return ratio of 100% , the analysis builds on a unique dataset
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of policy responses for given period. We record 82 policy interventions taken
over six years in only eleven CEE countries. This is not only a rich experience for
the region but also an ample pool of lessons for design of monetary, prudential,
supervisory or administrative measures elsewhere.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 focuses on the overall credit
growth characteristics in CEE. Furthermore it performs an out-of-sample econo-
metric analysis to evaluate whether the credit development of the countries was
excessive. Chapter 3 discusses the strengths, weaknesses and potential imple-
mentation issues of policy instruments to curb the credit growth. Chapter 4
presents results of the survey conducted among central banks in CEE. Chap-
ter 5 assesses selected country experiences by applying event studies that track
the application of the tools. Chapter 6 concludes.
Chapter 2
Credit growth in CEE
2.1 Some stylized facts
Financial systems in CEE countries are predominantly bank-based and
the key role is played by foreign banks. 85% of financial assets in CEE
are bank assets. Over last almost two decades, banking sector has undergone
transformation including changes in ownership, extension of banking services,
reforms in regulation, prudential measures etc.
Table 2.1 illustrates the ownership developments of the banking sector in
period 1999-2007. As can be inferred, consolidation of banks took place in
all but Baltic countries. Even though the total amount of banks decreased,
influence of foreign-owned banks strengthened over the time period. This can
be observed by an increase of total number as well as asset share of the foreign-
owned banks1. On the other hand, the privatization of banks resulted in a
dramatic decrease of asset share of state-owned banks.
The developments in the researched (sub)period 2003-2007 are less clean
cut. The overall structure of the banking sector did not evolve significantly.
Foreign banks maintained stable importance through means of both number of
institutions and their asset share. Consolidation of the sector was mostly over2
and total number of banks began to rise, yet again this was largely subject to
the entrance of new foreign-owned banks.
1Total amount of foreign-owned assets reached the level of more than 80% with exception
of Latvia and Slovenia.
2The process of consolidation was still present in Balkan countries, mainly Croatia and
Bulgaria.
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Table 2.1: Banks and their ownership in CEE (1999-2007)
Number of banks Asset share of Asset share of
(foreign-owned) foreign-owned banks (%) state-owned banks (%)
1999 2003 2007 1999 2003 2007 1999 2003 2007
Czech Republic 42(27) 35 (26) 37 (29) 38.4 86.3 84.8 41.2 3.0 2.4
Hungary 43(29) 38 (29) 40 (27) 61.5 83.5 64.2 7.8 7.4 3.7
Slovakia 23(10) 21 (16) 26 (15) 24.1 96.3 99.0 50.7 1.5 1.0
Slovenia 31(5) 22 (6) 27 (11) 4.9 18.9 28.8 42.2 12.8 14.4
Poland 77(39) 58 (46) 64 (54) 49.3 71.5 75.5 24.9 25.8 19.5
Croatia 53(13) 42 (19) 35 (16) 40.3 91.0 90.4 39.8 3.4 4.7
Bulgaria 34(22) 35 (25) 29 (21) 42.8 82.7 82.3 50.5 2.5 2.1
Romania 34(19) 30 (21) 31 (26) 43.6 54.8 87.3 50.3 40.6 5.7
Estonia 7(3) 7 (4) 15 (13) 89.8 97.5 98.8 7.9 0.0 0.0
Latvia 23(12) 23 (10) 25 (14) 74.0 53.0 63.8 2.6 4.1 4.2
Lithuania 13(4) 13 (7) 14 (6) 37.1 95.6 91.7 41.9 0.0 0.0
Source: EBRD (2009)
Private credit to GDP levels were above the pace of the euro area, albeit
the absolute levels remained relatively low. In 2003-2007 credit to private
sector rose significantly faster than in case of the euro area. The credit dynamics
in the region reached the highest pace in mid-2006 (Figure 2.1).
Considering the absolute values, credit in CEE was still below the levels of
developed economies: euro area private credit persistently amounted to more
than 100% of GDP. Figure 2.2 illustrates relative low levels of the private
credit-to-GDP in CEE. One can observe clear differences among Central (CEE-
5), Baltic (BE-3) and South-Eastern (SE-3) European economies.
Figure 2.1: Private credit growth 2003-2007: CEE vs. euro area
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Source: ECB, IFS IMF
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Figure 2.2: Private Credit Growth to GDP (2003-2007)
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Credit growth was driven by both households and corporates. Decompo-
sition of the private credit growth into households and corporates (Figure 2.3a)
suggests that the actual origin of the credit demand was fairly country specific.
The corporates absorbed from 14% in Slovakia up to 78% in Slovenia of total
private credit. Furthermore, data reveal that corporate credit change is pos-
itively correlated with total change in private credit. Looking at the case of
households, the most significant portion of the loans are mortgages. The most
palpable example is Estonia, the country with the largest domestic credit per
GDP, where mortgages amount to 97% of household loans and 51% of total
loans.
Figure 2.3: Household vs. Corporate Sector (2003-2007)
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Earlier findings (Enoch & O¨tker-Robe 2007) concluded that private credit
used to be driven by households. When extending the analysis until 2007,
Figure 2.3b shows that this is no longer the case and that the private credit
growth does not have a single-factor engine. In Lithuania and Estonia, the
growth pace was triggered almost equally by both households and firms.
In most countries, foreign currency denominated loans were a very sig-
nificant component of the credit growth. Even though the amount of FX
loans varies substantially, the phenomenon is quite widespread. As of mid-
2007 it appeared 7 out of 11 CEE economies. The exceptions are the Czech
Republic and Poland. Cases of Slovakia and Slovenia should be treated sep-
arately as both countries underwent the euro adoption. In case of Slovakia,
however, FX loans had not contributed significantly to the total loans (20%).
Right before the currency conversion, the share of FX loans in Slovenia was
65% (predominantly denominated in euro).
Figure 2.4: Foreign currency loans (% of total loans to the private
sector)
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Source: Zumer et al. (2009) and national central banks
Cross-border (direct) lending channel was very relevant in a number of
countries. Direct lending poses substantial limit on effectiveness of do-
mestic policy measures to dampen the credit dynamics. Table 2.2 illus-
trates the development of foreign claims in CEE. Total foreign claims consist of
cross-border claims and local claims on foreign affiliates’ in all currencies. This
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is an important distinction that allows us to see that besides activities of local
subsidiaries, many countries also faced direct foreign borrowing. Cross-border
credit was profound mainly in BE-3 and SE-3 and Hungary while rest of the
CEE-5 economies show higher portion of the claims of foreign affiliates. The
cross-border channel can represent serious troubles to domestic policymakers
as they are unable to control the credit development and domestic agents are
obtaining credit directly from abroad.
Table 2.2: Foreign claims (in USD bn, always end of the period)
Country Total foreign claims Cross-border claims Local claims
2005 2008 2010 2005 2008 2010 2005 2008 2010
CEE-5
Czech Republic 85.1 164.0 182.7 26.9 49.6 42.3 58.2 114.4 140.4
Slovakia 33.9 72.6 64.7 7.8 21.4 14.0 26.1 51.2 50.7
Slovenia 14.9 41.8 35.5 11.8 23.9 17.9 3.2 17.9 17.6
Hungary 72.5 136.3 116.8 36.1 66.1 57.2 36.4 70.1 59.6
Poland 103.5 239.5 293.1 32.4 63.7 82.7 71.1 175.8 210.4
SE-3
Bulgaria 9.4 31.7 34.4 3.5 11.9 12.1 6.0 19.8 22.3
Croatia 38.0 89.6 73.4 16.7 41.0 29.0 21.3 48.6 44.4
Romania 25.8 107.5 106.6 11.8 42.2 38.8 14.0 65.3 67.8
BE-3
Estonia 16.5 28.9 20.6 11.0 15.1 8.4 5.5 13.9 12.1
Latvia 9.9 30.4 24.1 5.1 8.4 7.3 4.7 22.0 16.8
Lithuania 11.1 26.9 24.4 8.8 13.8 14.8 2.3 13.1 9.6
Source: BIS
After the financial turmoil in the last quarter of 2008, the credit growth
suddenly turned into a credit crunch. Yet the downturn reflected also
country and region specific factors. The slowdown in credit growth occurred
in line with the global downturn. The crunch was especially strong in the
economies where credit growth was funded by the capital inflows. Foreign
mother banks, which were confronted with liquidity and capital shortages, came
under severe liquidity pressure and saw themselves forced to stop new lending
or even deleverage Bakker & Gulde (2010).
Furthermore, country and region specific factors also contributed to the
slowdown: extending domestic and regional imbalances, followed by a collapse
of domestic demand and correction in the housing market in a few countries
Zumer et al. (2009). On the top of that, given the excessive FX denominated
borrowing, credit developments were adversely affected by the exchange rate
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depreciation (where applicable by the exchange rate framework and existence
of FX lending phenomenon). The thesis will however primarily focus on the
period prior to the actual credit crunch.
Figure 2.5: Private credit growth 2008-Q3 to 2009-Q3
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2.2 Causes of the credit growth
Understanding the causes of the rapid credit growth is a crucial premise when
selecting viable policy instruments to restore the equilibrium levels. There are
a number of rather eclectic methods to approach the stimuli of credit dynamics.
To address the issue in a clean and simple way, the paper follows the division
into supply and demand factors suggested by Enoch & O¨tker-Robe (2007).
Nevertheless, even in this approach we cannot fully divide some factors since
they (by nature) stimulate both supply and demand side of the credit growth.
Demand factors: As economy develops, credit usually rises more quickly than
GDP. This phenomenon is known as financial deepening. Level of financial in-
termediation moves in tandem with the level of development of an economy
(IMF 2004)3. Thus higher confidence in domestic economy, higher incomes
and rise in demand helped to fuel demand for private loans. Optimistic expec-
tations about the future stemmed from the EU accession prospects and further
convergence. Within the researched period all CEE economies but Croatia
eventually joined the EU. Entry of foreign-owned banks did further strengthen
confidence in the banking sector.
Vast part of literature attributes the most important role to the catching-
up process that spurred from low financial deepening in the region. Borrowing
costs were eased as interest rates declined. In addition, pegged or managed
exchange rate regimes were source of stable and predictable exchange rate de-
velopments that made FX-denominating loans a choice.
In mortgage market, rising prices of real estates promoted the demand for
housing loans. On the top of that, much has been achieved by direct policies.
For instance tax deductibility of mortgage payments, subsidies or government
guarantees made certain type of loans even more attractive to the borrowers.
Supply factors: are mostly based on economic transition and the above men-
tioned catching-up process: privatization and deregulation of financial sector
attracted arrival of foreign banks into the region. Foreign-owned banks brought
better risk management practices and access to funding from parent banks
3Causality between the financial deepening and economic growth has been address by a
number of research papers from both theoretical and empirical point of view. Most papers
conclude that it is that financial deepening affects general economic growth rather than the
other way round. Nonetheless, questions remain about the robustness of the results (see IMF
(2004) for detailed literature overview).
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(Enoch & O¨tker-Robe 2007). Larger number of functioning banks improved
competition; hence narrowed the spreads and introduced new products. Overall
macroeconomic stabilization did not only mirror in the appetite for borrowing,
but also into the appetite for lending. This was mainly due to the improved
perception of creditworthiness of potential borrowers.
As country risk premiums fell and business sector conditions upgraded,
countries attracted large capital inflows. Cumulative capital inflows during
2003-07 ranged between 33% of 2003 GDP in the Czech Republic and 192% of
2003 GDP in Bulgaria (Bakker & Gulde 2010). Authors also stress that the
size of the capital inflows thus exceeded those pre-crisis Asia. Capital levels
were already high in 2003 and further increases yet extended huge differences
among CEE countries. Large capital inflows were caused by a combination of
purely regional / domestic conditions (reforms, low income levels) and global
environment (abundant liquidity, low risk aversion, low interest rates). Global
search for the yield led to surge in capital inflows in all emerging world. Bakker
& Gulde (2010) emphasize that CEE countries with larger influx of capital from
Western banks (e.g. Baltic states, Bulgaria) also had a larger increase in the
private sector credit-to-GDP ratio than countries where the influx was small
(Slovak Republic).
On the top of that, with European integration, EU structural funds served
as another new source of co-financing (namely in Latvia and Lithuania).
2.3 Literature Overview: How much is too much?
Credit growth is an extremely demanding concept to address. One of the
reasons behind the difficulty is that there is no correct answer to a simple
question: How much credit growth is too much? Private credit growth is
inherently beneficial and politically popular. Revivals of credit growth can
be seen as signs of a healthy banking system and returning confidence to the
economy (Enoch & O¨tker-Robe 2007, p.5). And yet, 75% of the credit booms
in emerging market economies are associated with a banking crisis, while 85 %
of the booms coincided with currency crises (IMF 2004).
IMF (2004) divides credit growth into three separate components: a) trend
(reflects financial deepening), b) cycle (normal cyclical upturns), c) boom (ex-
cessive cyclical movements). Special emphasis is given to the latter component.
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Excessive credit expansion (boom) is unsustainable and potentially risky part
of the credit growth.4
Nonetheless, it is not an easy task to identify excessive credit boom. There
is no well-accepted threshold that would allow to conclude that the growth is
excessive. On the side of quantification, much has been achieved in recent years
(Enoch & O¨tker-Robe 2007). In particular, three main methodologies have
been widely used in order to determine soundness of the credit developments:
a) “speed limits”, b) time series analysis, and c) econometric models that try
to derive equilibrium level of credit subject to macroeconomic fundamentals.
“Speed limit” is the most straightforward, albeit the least applied approach.
Speed limit is an arbitrary set threshold. Provided the credit expansion exceeds
the limit, credit growth is considered as excessive. This method was used in
Duenwald et al. (2007) that analyzes credit developments in Bulgaria, Romania
and Ukraine or Coudert & Pouvelle (2010) for a wider group of Central and
Eastern European economies.
Time Series Analysis helps to identify a trend in credit developments. The
estimated trend is considered as an equilibrium deepening of the financial sec-
tor. The credit boom is then defined as a credit growth that exceeds a certain
threshold around the trend (Kiss et al. 2006, p.4).
Most often the analysis is performed by applying Hodrick-Prescott filter,
i.e. filter that generates a smooth long-term trend of given series. Penalty
parameter for annual series λ is usually set to 100 as opposed to rolling H-P
filter with λ equal to 1000. The rationale behind such a quantification is that
rolling H-P filter would distort the characterization of credit cycles by shifting
them over time (IMF 2004).
In this respect, it is also viable to note that new Basel III proposes appli-
cation of credit-to-GDP as a calibration indicator for countercyclical capital
buffer. Here buffer is indicated by gap between ratio and trend. Trend is ob-
tained through HP by setting λ to 400,000 as it captures the long-term trend
4One important mechanism that can lead to a credit growth is the financial accelerator.
Financial accelerator arises from financial market imperfections that result from a) infor-
mation asymmetries (lenders vs. borrowers, regulatory issues or agency problems that lead
to the implementation of lending policies by some banks that may be affected by others)
b) institutional shortcomings (explicit or implicit government guarantees, lack of credible
economic policies), or c) perverse incentives facing borrowers and lenders which imply that
borrowers may face constraints (IMF 2004).
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in the behavior of the credit-to-GDP ratio in each jurisdiction (BIS 2010a, BIS
2010b).
More importantly, H-P can provide sensible solutions only when long time
series data are used. It is generally agreed that the minimum time span for
meaningful output is two decades for yearly data. Furthermore, there is another
obstacle in case of emerging economies: structural breaks caused by transition
may contribute to significant bias of the results (Boissay et al. 2007)5.
Econometric models deriving equilibrium level of credit-to-GDP ratio sub-
ject to macroeconomic fundamentals are the most popular method in case
of the CEE region. Even though literature recognizes different estimation tech-
niques, different sets of countries and variables, there is a crucial shared char-
acteristics: approach to set a benchmark.
All of the papers assume that the financial depth in the region remained
comparatively low and also that the period is still too short to draw any mean-
ingful results. In order to avoid biasness of econometric estimates, most papers
use estimation (of different groups) of developed countries for longer periods.
Developed countries in long run are perceived as a natural benchmark as CEE
are believed to converge to their level. To be more specific papers usually work
either with old EU member states (justified by EU catching-up process), de-
veloped economies in general (Boissay et al. 2007) or small OECD countries
(after careful analysis of a variety of panels E´gert et al. 2006, later Backe´ et al.
2007).
The entire process can be described as follows. Firstly in-sample panels
(developed countries) provide results regarding the influence of major macroe-
conomic determinants to private credit-to-GDP levels. Secondly, out-of-sample
analysis is performed. The estimates are used to obtain the equilibrium level
of private credit-to-GDP in CEE countries. Thirdly, the out-of-sample results
are compared with actual data, deviations are identified and discussed.
5For illustration Nakonthab & Subhawasdikul (2003) present an analysis for Thailand by
researching the components of the credit developments for the period of 50 years (1951-2002).
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Table 2.3: Literature Overview
Variables
Authors Methodology Dependent Explanatory
Boissay et al. (2007) VECM Private Credit GDP per capita,
on aggregated (%GDP) real int. rate,
eurozone data inflation.
Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) VECM Real loans Real GDP,
for individual to private real int. rates.
countries sector
Kiss et al. (2006) Pooled mean Private Credit PPP-based GDP
group estimator (%GDP) per capita,
(PMG) real interest rate,
inflation.
E´gert et al. (2006) Pooled OLS Private Credit PPP-based GDP,
FE OLS (%GDP) government credit,
MGE short and long-term
nominal int. rate,
inflation,
house prices,
interest rate spread,
credit registries.
later revisited in
Backe´ et al. (2007) Pooled OLS Private Credit PPP-based GDP,
Zumer et al. (2009) (%GDP) government credit,
long-term int. rate,
inflation,
interest rate spread.
Boissay et al. (2007) deals with credit developments in 8 CEE countries6
throughout the years 1996-2004. The selected period is fairly difficult to analyze
because of its turbulent character (notably the years 1996-1998).7 As a result
part of the analysis is conducted only on the data from 1999 onwards.
The results indicate that excessive credit growth occurred in the countries
with fixed exchange rate regimes, i.e. three Baltic states and Bulgaria. In
case of Hungary and Croatia the credit growth can also be considered as ex-
cessive, however to a lesser extend. Authors also disaggregated credit data by
currency. Here the results suggest that excessive borrowing can be the case in
both domestic and foreign currency.
6Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia
7The total outstanding loans-to-GDP remained under 40% in all countries. However, the
credit developments were very country specific. The worst situation, severe banking and
macroeconomic crisis, was witnessed the case of Bulgaria.
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Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) analyses the potential for lending booms in three
biggest CEE economies: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The main
idea of the research is to compare the effects of the process of European integra-
tion and the possible upcoming Euro adoption. For this purpose author chooses
to compare given CEE countries with Greece, Portugal and Ireland. The se-
lection is justified by saying that these economies can be seen as lower-income,
catching-up countries where “although annual credit growth rates exceeded
20-30 % in real terms, banking sectors have not yet been adversely affected”
(Brzoza-Brzezina 2005, p.2). When looking at the countries today, one may
start to question the selection of the countries as natural benchmark.
Again, paper works with vector error correction model, Brzoza-Brzezina
(2005) follows earlier methodology used by Calza et al. (2001), Calza et al.
(2003) and Hoffman (2001), i.e. real loans in private sector subject to real
GDP and real interest rate 8. Findings show strong increases in private credit
in Poland and Hungary, while the results for the Czech Republic remain low.
Nonetheless, the paper concludes that the credit developments are still sub-
stantially low compared to the experiences of Ireland and Portugal.
Kiss et al. (2006) use instrumental variable estimation technique to iden-
tify periods of boom (following the definition of IMF 2004) in 10 new EU
member states. Old eurozone countries are used as a benchmark (for a period
1980-2003). The paper works with the premise that in the long run financial
markets shall be fully integrated. Authors chose pool mean group estimator
(PMG) as it can be applied for models with rich and heterogeneous dynam-
ics. Besides aggregated data, the paper also deals with sectoral estimation - it
breaks down into household and corporates for a shorter period of 1995-2002.
The results suggest that all explanatory variables (PPP-based GDP per
capita, real interest rate and infation rate) are empirically significant. How-
ever, nearly half of the cross-section variance remained unexplained by the
model. Out-of-sample estimations shows that large credit growth observed in
the last decade in the countries can justified by fundamentals. Nonetheless,
credit growth was significantly faster than what could be justified along the
equilibrium path.
8Calza et al. (2001), Calza et al. (2003) and Hoffman (2001) estimated the effects of the
macroeconomic fundamentals on real loans in euro area countries. The specific selection of
explanatory variables may slightly vary: Calza et al. (2001) concerns with GDP and real
interest rates whereas later Calza et al. (2003) introduced also inflation, Hoffman (2001)
besides standard variables also tests the effect of housing prices.
2. Credit growth in CEE 16
In general, credit-to-GDP ratios are below levels justified by fundamentals
(initial undershooting). Latvia and Estonia can be considered as potentially the
most risky, having credit growth beyond any plausible adjustment rate.9 What
is more, out-of-sample calculations indicate that in the countries where risk of
a credit boom is non-negligible, it is dominantly the household indebtedness
that produces faster than equilibrium dynamics (Kiss et al. 2006).
E´gert et al. (2006) and later versions10 greatly contributed to the liter-
ature on credit developments for a number of reasons. First, the list of CEE
countries was expanded to eleven (the same sample as used in this thesis). This
is the largest CEE sample in the literature testing equilibrium credit growth in
CEE. Second, the first publication E´gert et al. (2006) carefully tested a num-
ber of possible benchmark country groups (emerging markets, small emerging
markets, all OECD, small OECD). After detailed discussion of significance and
signs of estimated parameters, small OECD countries were selected. Third,
authors developed eight models using alternative variables which served as ro-
bustness checks. The main model regressed private sector credit-to-GDP (CP)
on five explanatory macro variables: GDP per capita in purchasing power par-
ities (CAPITA), bank credit to public sector as a percentage of GDP, (CG),
long-term nominal interest rate (ilending), inflation measures by PPI index (pPPI)
and the spread between lending and deposit rate as a proxy to financial sector
liberalization (spread):
CP = f(CAPITA,CG, ilending, pPPI , spread) (2.1)
First results (as of the end of 2004) suggested that overall private credit-to-
GDP ratios tended to approach equilibrium levels. Derived range of deviation
(error margin) was however too large to clearly conclude whether the credit
to GDP is overshooting the equilibrium level or not. As of the end of 2004,
findings suggest that given the error margin only Croatia could have reached
the equilibrium level. Credit levels in other countries were still below the
equilibrium.
Backe´ et al. (2007) revised the earlier published works by extending the pe-
riod until 2006. The updated findings showed that the private sector level rose
9As for other country specific results, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia observed fast credit
growth but yet it can be explained by convergence. Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia
had no signs at all of excessive credit growth.
10Backe´ et al. (2007) and Zumer et al. (2009)
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a little more in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia. The most dramatic
upward movement occurred in Croatia and Latvia. Furthermore, Backe´ et al.
(2007) pointed that the latter two countries could have had future overshooting
propensities.
Zumer et al. (2009) revealed further increase of private credit to GDP. The
most pronounced results were in all Baltic economies, Hungary and Romania
and since 2006 also Poland.
2.4 Updated results for CEE
2.4.1 Methodology
In the spirit of E´gert et al. (2006) and later publications (Backe´ et al. 2007
and Zumer et al. 2009) we attempted to replicate the model. The shared idea
is the notion of behavioral equilibrium, i.e. the definition of equilibrium level
of private-sector credit as a level that is justified by economic fundamentals.
Deviation from the equilibrium can occur either in form of “undershooting”
or “overshooting”. Since the underlying economies are countries in transition,
we assume strong initial “undershooting” that could bias the data as the ad-
justment takes place. Therefore we work with the same benchmark panel of
small OECD countries (in-sample estimation). The fitted values are then used
to derive equilibrium levels of private credit-to-GDP for CEE economies and by
comparing them with empirical values we obtain deviations from the long-run
equilibrium (out-of-sample exercise). The updated results follow the method-
ology introduced by E´gert et al. (2006) with some minor modifications. All
the modifications to the original methodology are explained and justified as
follows.
We assume the same benchmark, set of in-sample countries, that is small
OECD economies11. Our in-sample estimation uses shorter but more consis-
tent period of 25 years (from 1980-Q1 to 2004-Q4).12 Having quarterly data,
we operate with exactly 100 observations per country. Data treatment follows
11The sample naturally consists only of the non-CEE small OECD economies: Austria, Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
12The original sample data began between 1975 and 1980 causing the dataset to ”unbal-
anced, as the length of the individual data series depended largely on data availability”(E´gert
et al. 2006). In our model we opt for a single specific start date: 1980-Q1 where all the listed
countries already have the data publicly available. As a result our dataset is strongly bal-
anced.
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the original methodology. In particular: data have been obtained form Inter-
national Financial Statistics of the IMF. In case the data are not quarterly
quoted, they have been linearly interpolated from annual figures. All data are
transformed into natural logarithms.
The most important divergence from E´gert et al. (2006) is the definition
of the dependent variable: private credit to GDP (CP). E´gert et al. (2006)
define bank credit to the private sector as a summation of claims on other
non-financial corporations and other resident sectors (households/non-profits)
and claims on other financial corporations13. However, the IMF stresses that
claims on other financial corporations (line 22g) equals claims on other financial
corporations (could be either public or private). Note that if a country has had
a banking crisis and has set up a bank restructuring agency to take on those bad
debts, even if it is publicly owned, it would be included there. That would be
one potential problem in the analysis depending on the size of the public non-
deposit taking financial sector. As result, we operate only with claims on other
non-financial corporations and other resident sectors (households/non-profits).
2.4.2 In-sample results
Private sector credit-to-GDP (CP) was regressed on five explanatory variables:
GDP per capita in purchasing power parities (CAPITA), bank credit to public
sector as a percentage of GDP, (CG), long-term nominal interest rate (ilending),
inflation measures by PPI index (pPPI) and the spread between lending and
deposit rate as a proxy to financial sector liberalization (spread). Table 2.4
illustrates the estimation of coefficients for fixed-effects model.
The original paper E´gert et al. (2006) tested different estimation method
and concluded fixed effects model as the most appropriate. Further extensions
of the paper (Backe´ et al. 2007 and Zumer et al. 2009) operate only with
FE OLS. Since we analyze long-term relationship between the data, we need
to make sure the private credit-to-GDP is cointegrated with the explanatory
variables. We can confirm our variables to be cointegrated. On the other
hand, when testing for stationarity we found out the data to be I(1) processes
- they are stationary in first differences. The detailed test statistics for both
stationarity and cointegration are provided in Appendix A.
The estimation results correspond with expected signs of explanatory vari-
13International Financial Statistics of the IMF denotes them as lines 22d and 22g respec-
tively.
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Table 2.4: In-sample estimation results for OECD countries
1980-Q1 - 2004-Q4.
CP= f(CAPITA,CG,ilending,pPPI,spread)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Intercept -5.525 (0.557) ***
capita 0.535 (0.053) ***
cg -0.093 (0.016) ***
i lending -0.294 (0.029) ***
p ppi -0.543 (0.215) **
spread -0.034 (0.018) *
R2 0.743 Adjusted R2 0.739
F (17, 1141) 193.583 P-value(F ) 0.000
Note *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance
level, respectively.
ables and all are statistically significant at least at 10% (CAPITA, CG and
ilending are significant at 1% and pPPI is at 5% significance level)14. Credit to
public sector (CG), nominal lending rates (ilending), inflation (pPPI) and (spread)
negatively influence private sector credit-to-GDP. On the other hand GDP per
capita (CAPITA) and private credit-to-GDP are positively related.
The original paper does not provide us with information about estimated
intercept, its significance or the coefficient of determination. Based on our
results, adjusted R-squared equals to 74.25% all constant term proved to be
significant at the 1% significance. The intercept estimation will be discussed
in greater detail in the out-of sample fitting.
2.4.3 Out-of-sample results
Next, the estimated coefficients are used to derive the equilibrium levels of
credit-to-GDP for CEE. The key assumption here is that there is long-run
parameter homogeneity between two country panels (Zumer et al. 2009). As
a matter of fact the approach is a double out-of-sample exercise: it works
with different set of countries and different time period (1993-Q1 to 2008-Q4).
The rationale behind the different time period is twofold. First, due to data
availability we start between 1993-Q1 and 1997-Q4. Second, the out-of sample
time period is deliberately extended until the verge of financial turmoil (2008-
14The original data estimation were not statistically significant for inflation, pPPI whereas
in our case the variable is significant at the 5%significance.
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Q4) without extending the in-sample timespan. This is due to the fact that
from global point of view, years directly prior to the crisis (2005-2007) can be
considered as a period of exuberance and could have probably introduced bias
(overestimation) to the long-term equilibrium credit levels.
In order to compare the fitted long-term equilibrium levels, we need to
address the issue of country-specific constants. Since the first model publication
E´gert et al. (2005) acknowledge that the short time period and the fact that
this period can be classified as a transition period for CEE, one cannot derive
directly country-specific constants. That is why, E´gert et al. (2005) introduce
the median level constant term (from in-sample regression) and an oscillation
range. There are a number of ways to construct the oscillation range (subject
to 95% confidence range, multiples of standard deviation, max-min etc.). E´gert
et al. (2005) proposes to use the maximum and minimum value from in-sample
constant as the safest bet. Since the min and max constants are not equally
distant from the mean, the oscillation range is not symmetric. In detail, the
country specific constants is slightly negatively skewed.
2.4.4 Evaluation of results
Figure 2.6 illustrates deviations of actual private sector-to-GDP levels from
long-run equilibriums. All the countries recently witnessed uprising tendencies
of the private credit. The oscillation range introduces uncertainty to the final
results. Nonetheless, some patterns in credit developments can be observed.
All the economies reached long-term equilibrium at least by the upper es-
timate. What is more, in case of Latvia, Estonia, Croatia, Bulgaria and partly
Hungary even the lower estimate exceeded the long-run equilibrium. These
cases of overshooting are largely in accordance with general consensus and styl-
ized facts about the credit boom in the region. The oscillation ranges of Zumer
et al. (2009) are slightly shifted down the y axis. Therefore Zumer et al. (2009)
does not identify any economy to have entire range above the equilibrium, yet
they consider Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia to be very close.
Most of the countries seem to have approached the equilibrium level and
their oscillation range is fairly spread around the zero deviation level. In par-
ticular, Czech Republic and Slovakia have medium levels slightly undershooted
but very close to equilibrium. Also, Poland and Romania are moving fairly
close to the equilibrium, but having a constantly rising trend, their mean de-
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viations turned positive during the year 2008. Anyway, as the time series stop
at the end of 2008 we are not able to examine the issues further.
Compared to the original model two countries differ significantly: Slovenia
and Romania. In case of Slovenia we derived a very large range of oscilla-
tion that is strongly biased to lower values. This was largely due to the fact
that Slovenian macro data are very strong. Hence when comparing the ac-
tual (but based on the stylized facts quite elevated) level of private credit to
GDP with fundamentally-derived ones, the results suggest possible very large
undershooting. In this case, the best treatment would be to obtain different
country specific constant estimation that could reach to more straightforward
conclusion.
The issue of Romania varies from Zumer et al. (2009) because of the different
definition of private credit to GDP that was discussed before. The reason is that
we do not operate with line 22g of IFS claims on other financial corporations
but only with claims on other non-financial corporations and other resident
sectors (households/non-profits). That is why our results in Romania does not
exhibit as pronounced downward and consequent upward shifts since 2005 as
in Zumer et al. (2009) but they have smoother uprising trend.
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Figure 2.6: Deviations of actual from long-run equilibrium private
sector-to-GDP levels 1993-Q1 to 2008-Q4
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Estonia
Negative values: observed private sector-to-GDP ratio is smaller that fundamentally-
predicted one (undershooting). Positive values: observed private sector-to-GDP ratio
is larger that fundamentals (overshooting).
Chapter 3
How to tame the credit boom?
Policy responses have been the subject of much controversy for a number of
reasons. Prior to the credit crunch, the global view favored the approach
of benign neglect rather than a more proactive policy stance. Justifications
were twofold. First, as has been pointed out in the previous chapter, it is a
demanding task to clearly identify excessive credit expansion that is not in
line with macroeconomic fundamentals. Second, any measure entails costs and
distortions. And yet, not all credit booms are followed by financial crisis or poor
macroeconomic performance. As a result, introduction of proactive measures
is a challenging task. Its ex ante valuation, indeed.
However, even upon deciding to act, the task is not about to become any
easier as more questions emerge. What policy tools do policymakers actually
have at their disposal? How powerful they are? What are the limitations?
Crowe et al. (2011) stress that there is “no silver bullet” among the policy
options. Each policy introduces costs and distortions and its effectiveness is
limited by loopholes and implementation problems. Broad reaching measures
(e.g. monetary policy rates) are more difficult to circumvent, and hence po-
tentially more effective, but will typically involve greater cost. On the other
hand, more targeted measures (e.g. specific macroprudential measures) may
limit costs but will be challenged by loopholes, jeopardizing efficiency (Crowe
et al. 2011).
Needless to say, one must also account for the interactions across the range
of the tools, their complementaries as well as potential conflicts. At last, ev-
ery economy is unique in its distinctive characteristics and institutions that
significantly influence feasibilities of each measure and possible trade-offs.
Rapid credit growth poses both opportunities and challenges to economic
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policymakers. The dilemma is how to successfully avoid overheating pressures
or financial crisis without hindering demand and economic growth. Before
discussing set of policy instruments central authorities have in hand to fight
the negative effects of credit growth, it is viable to address the issue of riskiness
of the credit growth.
3.1 Risks
Table 3.1 summarizes the main risks associated with credit growth. Hilbers
et al. (2005) list the set of potential risks based on the various features of
credit developments. In other words, risks stem from the very nature of the
credit growth; notably its pace (speed), main providers of credit (foreign versus
domestic institutions, banks versus other financial institutions), main borrow-
ers (households versus corporate sector), specific sectoral loan concentration or
composition of credit (mortgages, durable consumer goods, investments etc.),
currency denomination, maturity of loans and sources of credit. Two most
frequently identified types of risk are credit and macroeconomic risks. Further-
more, by nature the risks can often be causally linked. This may be the case
especially in period of a very rapid credit boom.
Macroeconomic risk is a thread to macroeconomic stability. Emergence or
worsening of economic imbalances can result from a number of aspects: high
speed of credit growth, concentration and strategy of the main providers of
credit, sectoral composition of loans etc. Based on IMF (2004), 70% of credit
booms coincide with either investment or consumption boom in emerging mar-
ket. As credit boom fuels domestic demand, it created pressure on prices in
asset, good and labor markets. Firstly, purely domestic impact may come to
mind: inflationary pressures. Secondly, higher domestic demand also leaks out
through demand for foreign goods (imports), thus deteriorating trade balance.
As a result, country may face a serious issues ranging form loss of competitive-
ness, currency appreciation to large current account deficits. Provided sectoral
composition of loans is unbalanced, credit booms may besides inflation result
also in swift upswing of house prices or fuel asset bubbles.
Credit risk, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with deteriorating
quality of loans. Again reasons are manifold, from aggressive risk strategies
by main providers of credit, insufficient loan assessment, weak diversification
of loans to lack of expertise in monitoring (Table 3.1). Furthermore, during
credit booms, assessment may also be biased by currently strong economic situ-
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Table 3.1: Key Risks Associated with Credit Growth
Aspects Type of Risk Notes
Speed Credit risk Inadequate loan assessment, ability to monitor and
assess risks
Macro risks
Main providers Credit risk Aggressive lending strategies
Macro risks
Main borrowers Credit risk Corporate loans sensitive to the economic situation
Consumer loans sensitive to collateral values
Macro risks Likely impact of loans on the current account
Market risks Sensitivity to economic activity and price changes
Sectoral composition Credit risk Concentration, collateral values for mortgages etc.
Macro risks Impact on the current account in the case of con-
sumer/investment loans
Market risks Sensitivity to real estate prices
Currency composition Foreign exchange risk Direct exposure (through net open positions of
banks)
Indirect exposure (via borrowers)
Maturity Maturity/liquidity
risks
Longer-term loans financed through shorter-term
borrowing
Sources of credit Foreign exchange risk Loans funded by bank borrowing
Maturity risks When liabilities short-term, assets longer-term
Macro risks From exposure to market sentiment
Source: Hilbers et al. (2005)
ation (corporate sector) and rising values in underlying collateral (households).
Duenwald et al. (2007) estimate the likelihood of a banking crisis following a
lending boom to be 20%.
Next, foreign exchange risk may be significant especially in case of high
share of FX-denominated loans or tendency to borrow from abroad. The FX
risk can have either direct or indirect character. Exposures to the direct FX risk
then stem from on-lending in domestic currency. On the other hand, exposures
to the indirect risk is created by on-lending in foreign currency to unhedged
borrowers.
Understanding the nature of the risk (both macroeconomic or financial
risks) is crucial in order to focus on the appropriate policy response. As a
matter of fact, the risks are often interrelated which requires a package of both
macro and prudential tools.
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3.2 Macroeconomic measures
3.2.1 Monetary policy
When discussing monetary measures, the most important question to ask is
whether the current macroeconomic environment is stabilized or not. Tighten-
ing of the monetary conditions can reduce overheating pressures via adversely
affecting either demand for loans or liquidity base. As a consequence, credit
expansion should slow down and economy may avoid high inflationary pres-
sures or current account deterioration. On the other hand, Crowe et al. (2011)
emphasize that in case of tranquil macroeconomic environment, monetary pol-
icy actions can be too blunt and costly as the interest rate hikes would entail
significant costs in terms of output gap and desired inflation rates.
Rise in key policy rates makes borrowing more expensive and reduces demand
for loans. Provided monetary transmission mechanism works properly, higher
policy rates should be reflected in higher bank lending rates, hence directly
impacting the cost of borrowing. Based on country experiences, the most wor-
risome was the mortgage market. Here higher interest rate payments translate
into lower house affordability index.1 As a result smaller amount of borrowers
can qualify for specific loans (Crowe et al. 2011).
Interest rate increases pose however many concerns. As interest rates affect
entire economy, they shall be used only to address macroeconomic overheating
pressures. Second, higher domestic interest rates may adversely affect borrow-
ing structure, for instance shift of borrowing to foreign currency denominated
loans. Third, raising interest rates can attract more capital inflows and fuel
appreciation pressures. Fourth, the impact may be even more limited in case
of fixed/quasi fixed exchange rate regimes and free capital mobility. Fifth, the
outcome largely depends on the dependence between long-term (often mort-
gage) loans and policy rates in that particular economy. Sixth, based on the
US sub-prime mortgage loan experience, speculation is not likely to be affected
by change in key policy rates (see Crowe et al. 2011).
1House affordability index is defined as follows
HAI =
Median Household Income
Qualifying Income for a Mortgage Loan
× 100
where qualifying income is derived from the monthly payment on the median priced home
at the effective mortgage interest rate.
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Changes in the reserve requirements (RR) are an extremely strong instrument
widely used in CEE during the transition period. Enoch & O¨tker-Robe (2007)
stress that an increase in RR can be essential in one-off sterilization of excess
liquidity or in accommodation of structural changes in demand for reserves.
Besides changes in the required level, measures often include also reserve re-
quirements differentiated by the currency, type of deposit or broadening the
reserve base.
Figure 3.1: Box - Marginal reserve requirements
Marginal reserve requirements (MRR) are special extension of regular reserve
requirements. In our set of countries they were used in Bulgaria and Croatia.
However, the way of measure design is substantially various and deserves special
treatment.
Croatia used the MRR mostly over the period 2004-2006. MRR were intro-
duced on foreign exchange deposits and liabilities by requiring banks to make
additional non-interest bearing deposits with the Hrvatska Narodna Banka
(HNB) if the foreign liabilities increased over a defined threshold. Over the
time MRR evolved and the calculation modified, however they still resemble
standard RR in the tax-type nature, in particular reserve requirements differ-
entiated by the currency. Yet the difference is in the marginal character: MRR
restrict only new FX liabilities with respect to specific base (in other words only
incremental values). Thus, structure of MRR lies somewhere between regular
monetary and prudential tools.
The measure was particularly popular because it is directly aimed at FX bor-
rowing and it is relatively easy to implement. One can argue that MRR help
reduce financial stability risk as it may give banks an incentive to restructure
funding towards more domestic deposit and increase the capitalization levels.
On the other hand, circumvention to less-supervised channels can often be the
case.
Bulgaria worked with MRR as a measure to reinforce credit ceilings. Bank
credit that was in excess of the limit was subject to the marginal reserve re-
quirements. Here marginal requirements were of huge size (starting at 200%
and rose higher over time). The marginal character is therefore derived from
the ceiling values and can also be seen as penalty deposit rate.
To sum up we will consider Croatian MRR to be close to general RR and
Bulgarian to be linked with administrative measures (together with credit ceil-
ings).
However, RR changes have many limitations as they hinder financial inter-
mediation (i.e. RR are perceived as a tax on financial intermediation as they
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do not generate interest paid). Possible negative outcomes are lower financial
deepening, moving of the banks offshore or in case of subsidiaries higher bor-
rowing form parents2, banks accepting more risky projects, discrimination of
banks vis-a`-vis non-banks. As a result, it is seldom used in developed econ-
omies. Even if RR are raised in one-off manner, it can under no condition
occur on frequent basis. Furthermore, successful implementation depends on
particular constraints of monetary regimes (e.g. existence of currency boards
or currency unions).
3.2.2 Exchange rate policy
Exchange rate policy measures address the foreign exchange risk of the credit
growth. The risk is associated with significant FX-denominated borrowing
or/and tendency to borrow from abroad. Furthermore, Hilbers et al. (2005)
argue the main problem is misperception of FX risks by economic agents. In
particular, it is a combination of two factors: seemingly predictable exchange
rates and high interest rates differentials that are not consistent with exchange
rate regime. As a result it may create misperception of low exchange rate risk
and encourage FX-denominated borrowing. Standard macroeconomic toolkit
includes increasing exchange rate flexibility and consistent mix of exchange rate
and monetary policy.
Increasing the flexibility of exchange rates limits the predictability of exchange
rate developments thus may correct for the FX risk underestimation. Hilbers
et al. (2005) illustrate the successful case of Poland in early 2000s where after
authorities increased exchange rate flexibility and allowed for domestic interest
rates to narrow (in combination with supervisory tools). As a result economy
managed to reduce the amount of FX-denominated loans.
Nevertheless the tool is strictly limited by the nature of exchange rate
regime. A few CEE economies operate under pegged exchange rate regimes
(currency boards, quasi-currency boards, ERM-II arrangements etc.). How-
ever, even in this case policymakers can attempt to maintain consistent mix of
exchange rate and monetary policy.
Maintaining consistent mix of exchange rate and monetary policy means
keeping domestic interest rates consistent with particular exchange rate regime
2Having foreign parent banks and an economy with open capital account, changes in RR
may not be effective unless the ability to borrow from the mothers is taken into account
(Hilbers et al. 2005).
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to limit incentive for excessive FX-borrowing or lending. Moreover, the mea-
sure should go hand in hand with other macroprudential measures in order to
address the structural factors of the system that contribute to high interest
margins (e.g. high risk premium, high transaction or operational costs, tax
distortions). Hilbers et al. (2005) further ague that keeping domestic rates
consistent with exchange rate commitment is the first best policy for not-fully
flexible exchange rate regimes.
3.2.3 Fiscal policy
Tightening of the fiscal policy may in theory help counter the credit boom.
Crowe et al. (2011) discusses specific fiscal measures that can hinder one el-
ement of the private credit growth - real estate booms: transaction taxes or
property taxes. The authors also discuss the potential of the measures in a
countercyclical manner. In practice, there are, however, significant caveats to
the fiscal approach. First, across CEE economies a fiscal situation is often too
tight and there is not much room for further tightening. Second, political and
technical problems may greatly complicate the situation. Third, tighter fis-
cal stance may provide further incentives to circumvent the measure (e.g. via
misreporting of property values) and hence it requires further supervisory mea-
sures. Fourth, in case of mortgage booms the evidence of relationship between
the tax treatment of residential property and real estate cycles in inconclusive
(for more arguments about real estate markets see Crowe et al. 2011).
Nonetheless, the policymakers can still react via avoiding fiscal / quasi fis-
cal incentives that may encourage certain type of lending, specifically explicit
subsidies, guarantees for housing loans, interest rate deductibility of mortgage
loans. These measures reduce structural distortions that cause bias to eco-
nomic incentives. Also, they may tame overheating pressures that undermine
macroeconomic stability.
The cooperation of fiscal and monetary policy would achieve superior re-
sults, however it is rarely the case. Hilbers et al. (2005) argues that fiscal
policy is appropriate to apply when ability to use monetary tools is limited or
nonexistent. On the other hand, Galati & Moessner (2011) imply that given
the governance issues and a lower frequency of fiscal policy decisions, in prac-
tice fiscal policy becomes more the Stackelberg leader. Consequently, monetary
policy decisions that occur at high frequency take fiscal stance as given.
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3.3 Prudential and Supervisory Measures
Prudential and supervisory measures are primarily concerned with strengthen-
ing the banking sector rather than dampening the credit boom. Nonetheless,
Crowe et al. (2011) admits that when policy succeeded in slowing down a boom
and avoiding systemic crisis in a credit crunch, it almost always involved some
prudential measures.
Justification of the measures is yet subject to the nature of risk associated
with the credit growth. Prudential and supervisory measures are suitable when
eliminating inconsistencies or distortions in the market (e.g. excessive loan
concentration or unhedged FX positions). Otherwise, prudential tools and
supervision should be designed so that they support macroeconomic policies,
i.e. they should be part of a comprehensive package of measures rather than
a separated tool. Hilbers et al. (2005) emphasize that there are limits to what
prudential policies can do in the absence of prudent fiscal polices, or if monetary
fiscal regimes persistently create incentives that encourage credit growth. As
a result prudential measures are typically employed along with monetary or
direct instruments.
Successful implementation of prudential and supervisory measures stands
upon a wide range of requirements. In detail, these are adequate enforcement
capacity of regulatory authorities, cross-border supervisory cooperation (fur-
thermore in case of foreign-owned banks, adequate scrutiny from supervisors
in Western European home countries) and coordination between supervisors of
bank and non-bank financial institutions. Unless a common dialog and cooper-
ated measures are achieved, single attempts to cure the excessive credit growths
may not only prove unsuccessful, but also create new loopholes in the system
and introduce further obstacles. Put differently, it is impossible to design a
stable and resilient domestic financial system independent of a global network.
3.3.1 Prudential toolkit
This section addresses both macroprudential and microprudential policy op-
tions. Sheng (2010) argues we must not make the intellectual mistake of sep-
arating macroprudential and microprudential supervision, because both are
examining the whole and parts of the whole. Since individual activities have
externalities, then what appears to be stable individual institutions does not
necessarily add up to be a stable system. The fact that a system appears stable,
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does not mean that individual components of the system are stable, especially
if the externalities of parts cancel each other out (Sheng 2010).
Table 3.2 illustrates the basic stylized characterization of the different na-
tures of two perspectives (for more detailed info see Borio et al. 2001, Borio
2003, Galati & Moessner 2011). The following part deals with the measures
that were at least to some extend applied in CEE countries, specifically capi-
tal requirements, provisioning rules, eligibility criteria for loans (loan-to-value,
loan-to-income rations), measures targeted on FX borrowing. Figure 3.2 fur-
ther provides a detailed list the instruments in question.
Table 3.2: Macroprudential vs Microprudential perspectives
Macroprudential Microprudential
Proximate objective Limit financial system-wide
distress
Limit distress of individual in-
stitutions
Ultimate objective Avoid macroeconomic costs
linked to financial instability
Consumer (investor / deposi-
tor) protection
Characterization of risk Endogenous (dependent on
collective behavior)
Exogenous (independent of in-
dividual behavior)
Correlations and expo-
sures across institutions
Important Irrelevant
Calibration of prudential
controls
In terms of system-wide risk;
top-down
In terms of risks of individual
institutions; bottom-up
Instruments Countercyclical capital re-
quirements
Quality / quantity of capital
Source: Borio (2003) and Galati & Moessner (2011)
Unlike monetary policy, prudential measures have narrower and more tar-
geted goals which results in reduced costs. Their primary objective is to
strengthen the banking system not to limit the credit boom. Therefore even if
they fail to stop the boom, they may still help to cope with the crunch. On
the other hand, few caveats are in order. First, as these instruments are more
narrow, it is easier to circumvent them and encourage regulatory arbitrage and
risk-shifting. Second, macroprudential framework is still in infancy, thus there
is a call for more research to be done in this area. Third, authorities may face
implementation impediments from the political standpoint. Crowe et al. (2011)
notes that over time monetary policy decisions have come to be accepted as
a necessary evil thanks to credibility and independence of the central banks.
In contrast prudential measures might be considered as unnecessary intrusion
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into the functioning markets and unlike macro policies such an implementation
would clearly distinguish winners from losers. Specific measures also entail
specific strong and weak points that are to be addressed as we discuss them in
detail.
Higher capital requirements or higher risk weights help to reduce total lending
capacity, create capital buffers and foster resilience against the losses during
busts. Capital requirement can further be differentiated based on loan type,
maturity, currency composition etc.
High risk weights require banks to hold more capital against a portfolio.
Thus they can decrease ROAE of banks while creating larger capital buffers
against losses. Provided the weights are risen unilaterally, specific country can
be made less attractive vis-a`-vis other regional markets.
In general the capital requirements in CEE region were well above the Basel
II accords. Nonetheless, Bakker & Gulde (2010) argue that prudential mea-
sures need to be designed in accordance with risk profile. In context of CEE
economies it means that rules may be more strict than in more mature econo-
mies. As we will discuss in the next chapter both capital requirement and risk
weights built under Basel II were feared to be too low and consequently some
countries decided to tighten the measures to correspond with their particular
risk exposures.
Recently capital requirements have been extensively discussed especially in
connection with its potential procyclical character (see Crowe et al. 2011,Galati
& Moessner 2011, Shin et al. 2010). Literature standardly divides macropru-
dential measures based on their dimension into time-series and cross-sectional3.
In particular, capital requirements could be able to address the time-series di-
mension of financial stability, i.e. help building capital buffers in good times
and thus dampen inherited procyclicality of the system. Countercyclical change
in risk weights by loan type can affect price of that particular lending. How-
ever, based on the CEE experience, Zumer et al. (2009) acknowledges that the
recent crisis has underscored the importance of proactive policies in the up-
ward phase of the credit cycle, notably policies minimizing procyclicality and
building reserves for bad times.
Careful design of these measures is key to limit circumvention. Provided
3 Time-series dimension captures the evolution of risk over time period. Cross-sectional
dimension focuses on how risk is distributed at a point in time within the system. For detailed
analysis see extensive literature overview on macroprudential policy by Galati & Moessner
(2011).
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settings get too complicated, enforcement could become cumbersome and the
effectiveness easily undermined. The complexity of the set-up may be the issue
especially in cyclical context (see Kashyap et al. 2008). Effectiveness is also
limited when capital ratios are already high.
Tighter eligibility criteria for certain loans can be set through limits on loan-
to-value ratio (LTV), loan-to-income ratio (LTI), debt service-to-income (DTI)
etc. Eligibility criteria can work as quantity-based measures as they introduce
limit on demand of credit. Stricter eligibility criteria can be very useful tool to
reduce banking lending under condition that reporting requirements are ade-
quate and supervision of both banks and non-banks is coordinated to limit risk
of circumvention (Hilbers et al. 2005).
Loan-to-value ratio (LTV) measures willingness to pay, i.e. it reflects the size
of downpayment. Often caps on LTV infer the character of default risk. Limits
on LTV can prevent vulnerabilities on borrower side. Lower the leverage, the
greater the drop in prices needed to put borrower into negative equity. From
macro point of view it implies fewer defaults. Even in case of default, lender is
able to obtain high recovery ratios (Crowe et al. 2011).
Loan-to-income ratio (LTI) and debt service-to-income (DTI) serve as afford-
ability measures as they illustrates the ability to pay vis-a`-vis the income4. Put
differently, caps on the ratios anchor credit growth to the wage level. Therefore,
caps on LTI or DTI reduce vulnerabilities to the financial sector as it becomes
more resilient to drop in wages or temporary unemployment.
Since the measures are fairly clear, tighter eligibility criteria have immediate
and transparent consequences. Nonetheless, a few concerns are in place. First,
the eligibility criteria greatly depend on approaches to the valuation of collat-
eral. Second, the role of regulatory measures is of great importance. Third, the
calibration of caps on LTV, DTI and LTI is still at infancy. This is particularly
the case in countercyclical measures. Borio et al. (2001) provides elaborated
discussion of LTV and experiences of the developed countries. Nonetheless,
when applicable tighter eligibility criteria should go hand in hand with tighter
rules on valuation criteria.
4Although there is no common definitions of these ratios, they usually exclude information
such as borrower expenses or tax liabilities. In particular, they are usually defined as follows:
DTI =
All debt-servicing payments
Gross income
;LTI =
Monthly payment of the loan
Monthly income
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Liquid asset requirements (LAR) can work for both monetary and prudential
purposes. From monetary perspective it is an obligation of commercial banks
to maintain a predetermined percentage of total deposits and certain other lia-
bilities in form of liquid assets (Guide et al. 1997). Higher LARs force banks to
demand more liquid assets and vice-versa. From prudential perspective, tighter
LARs provide “sand in the wheels” against rapid lending by forcing banks to
hold funds in liquid assets (Hilbers et al. 2005). As a consequence, Hilbers et al.
(2005) emphasizes that LARs can help to control lending capacity via suitable
selection of eligible securities, eligible maturities, and averaging methods.
LARs are favored thanks to their simplicity and ability to be monitored rel-
atively easily. On the other hand, LARs tend to be often replace by a more
market-based instruments. Nonetheless, LARs are sometimes imposed along
with other instruments. For instance, FX currency liquidity requirements can
effectively be accompanied with higher LAR on short-term liabilities.
FX-targeted measures were fairly popular among CEE economies given the el-
evated level of FX-denominated loans in a few countries. Foreign currency
borrowing and associated risks has been largely discussed in academic litera-
ture (see Rosenberg & Tirpak 2008, Bakker & Gulde 2010). As a matter of fact
two main scenarios applied in CEE region were: central authority introduced
FX-targeted measures in order to either limit specific issues such as capital in-
flows or rapid credit boom in foreign currency or central authority introduced
FX-targeted measures along with other domestically-oriented policies and also
discussed exchange rate measures.
Hence there is a wide range of tools to limit the FX-denominated lending
on both demand and supply side, in particular:
(a) Tightening of net open position limits for banks
(b) Imposing special capital requirements or risk weights on the currency com-
position
(c) Imposing marginal reserve requirements on foreign liabilities (see Box 3.1)
(d) Targeting unhedged borrowers, tightening eligibility requirements for FX
loans, limiting FX loans to borrowers with foreign income or adequate
hedging
(e) More intensive surveillance and monitoring of banks with large share of FX
loans in their portfolio
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3.3.2 Supervision and Monitoring
High speed of credit growth can introduce pressure on otherwise strong and
resilient financial sector. As a consequence policymakers need to resort to
tighter supervisory and monitoring measures. The objectives are mainly to
strengthen market discipline on banks, improve transparency of the system,
limit room for aggressive lending practices or counter liquidity, credit, interest
rate, foreign exchange and systemic risk associated with credit booms.
Hilbers et al. (2005) emphasize market-based instruments such as use of
periodic stress testing, improved reporting and disclosure rules, periodic surveys
of FX exposures etc. Furthermore, the essential part of successful supervision
and monitoring is to improve coordination of bank and non-bank supervision
as well as the collaboration with home supervisors of foreign-owned banks.
The latter measures are particularly important in order to prevent regulatory
arbitrage and further circumvention issues.
3.4 Other Measures
To get a full picture of possible policy options, we also need to approach two
extremes: the measures of the first and the last resort. The first is promotion
of better understanding of risks, the latter are administrative measures.
Promotion of better understanding of risks is a keystone in improving credit
culture in the economy. For illustration those are disclosure of information, con-
sultative meetings with banks, establishing credit bureaus and registries. Al-
though, such tools are rather soft techniques, they play crucial role in strength-
ening market discipline and capacity to cope with credit booms.
On the side of the spectrum are administrative measures. Administra-
tive (direct) measures are explicitly aimed to limit the source of funding, for
instance controls on capital inflows, reserve requirements on bank borrowing
from abroad, differentiated reserve requirements on domestic and foreign cur-
rency. Direct tools are strong inhibitors of credit growth. However, on the
other hand, they often entail huge costs, distortions and their effect is mostly
only temporary. Administrative measures are advised to apply only as a last
resort policy, however, as will be analyzed further, these tools did occur in CEE
region over the researched period.
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Figure 3.2: Menu of Policy Options to Rapid Credit Growth
Macroeconomic 
Policy Measures
Prudential 
Measures
Supervisory/ 
Monitoring 
Measures
Market 
Development 
Measures
Administrative 
Measures
Promotion of 
Better 
Understanding of 
Risks
Fiscal
Measures
Monetary 
Measures
Exchange 
Rate Policy
• Fiscal tigthening
• Avoiding fiscal/quasi-fiscal incentives that may encourage 
certain lending
• Interest rate tightening
• Reserve requirements
• Liquid asset requirements
• Sterilization operations
• Increase exchange rate flexibility
• In general maintain a consistent mix of monetary and 
exchange rate policy
• Higher/differentiated capital requirements
• Tighter/differentiated loan classification provisioning
• Tighter eligibility criteria for certain loans
• Dynamic provisioning
• Tighter collateral rules
• Rules on credit concentration
• Tightening net open FX position limits
• Maturity mismatch regulations, and guidance to avoid 
excessive reliance on short-term borrowing
• Increasing disclosure requirements for banks on risk 
management and internal control policies and practices
• Closer onsite/offsite inspection/surveillance of potentially 
problem banks or those with aggressive lending
• Periodic stress testing 
• Periodic monitoring/ survey of banks’ and customers 
exposure
• Increasing supervisory coordination of banks and nonbank 
financial institutions
• Improved dialogue between domestic and home supervisors 
of foreign banks
• Encouraging development of hedging instruments
• Developing asset management instruments to deal with 
distressed assets
• Developing securities markets to reduce dependence on bank 
credit and improve diversification of banks’ credit risks
• Improving credit culture (establishment of credit bureaus, 
credit registry, stronger legal system,  reditor rights, etc.)
• Improving banks’ and corporations’ accounting standards
• Overall or bank-bybank credit limits
• Marginal reserve requirements based on credit growth
• Controls on capital flows: e.g.,
• Control on foreign borrowing by banks and/or bank customers
• Diff. reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency
• Taxes on financial intermediation
• Import restrictions
• Strengthening banks’ ability to monitor, assess, manage risks
• Public risk awareness campaigns, press statements, etc.
• Discussions/ meetings with banks (“moral suasion”) to warn 
or persuade banks to slow down credit extension
Source: Hilbers et al. (2005)
Chapter 4
Survey results: Policy measures
The chapter summarizes policy responses in the period of the most pronounced
credit boom (2003-08). We attempt to answer a set of questions: What instru-
ments were used the most to alleviate credit boom in CEE region? How much
did the measures differ regionally? Can we observe any patterns or trends over
time period?
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, credit developments significantly varied
across the region. Policy measures also offer wide scale of intensities. Chapter 3
listed the menu of tools policymakers have in hand to counter the credit boom,
their strengths, weaknesses and potential implementation issues. However, the
tools can be applied for a different purposes from price stability, capital inflows
to upgrading local supervision in line with the EU standards. It is particu-
larly challenging to identify a toolkit that can be considered to influence the
credit growth. Hilbers et al. (2005), that hugely contributed to the discussion,
approached the measures with potential impact on credit growth.
Our data were collected via direct survey among eleven central banks. In
the survey, central banks were kindly asked to provide us with the information
whether or not they implemented any of the instruments in period 2003-2008 to
control the credit growth per se. Based on direct involvement of central banks,
we assume good accuracy of the policy responses. Nonetheless, we acknowledge
the interconnection of the goals.
The chapter is organized as follows: first we list the overall results of the
survey, next the developments are discussed on regional basis by splitting the
CEE into three sub-regions. At last, we look more closely at the most popular
measures used.
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4.1 Summary of the results
The core data were collected via direct survey across the central banks in the
CEE region. Central authorities were asked to provide information regarding
the measures used over the period 2003-2008 to control the credit growth. The
survey consisted of three main parts: a) monetary policy measures, b) pruden-
tial and supervisory measures, and c) administrative and other administrative
measures. Hilbers et al. (2005) conducted an analogous study covering re-
sponses to the credit developments until mid-2005. The study was used as a
guidance to clearly select relevant areas of the issues.
The survey was conducted in form of a simple questionnaire where central
banks were to identify whether or not they undertook any of the listed instru-
ments in period 2003-2008. If affirmative, they were to specify the date (month
and year) when such steps were taken. Importantly, we managed to receive
responses from all eleven central banks (return ratio = 100%)1.
Table 4.1 illustrated the overall list of measures used within the region.
As can be inferred the CEE experience is very rich, every measure asked was
implemented at least in one of the countries. Yet, the country experiences var-
ied significantly. This conclusion is in line with the estimation results of credit
growth excessiveness that is conducted in Chapter 2. Most of the countries that
were identified to exhibit the rapid credit booms resorted to more active policy
involvement. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of the responses across the
CEE region provide us with a unique possibility to compare the countries that
made more effort to act against the adverse developments with the other in the
region via difference-in differences estimations.
Hypothesis 4.1. Exchange rate regime mattered both in scale and scope of re-
sponses.
When looking at the table 4.1, we can clearly cannot reject the hypoth-
esis that exchange rate regime played a significant role in scale and scope of
responses. The fears about excessiveness of the credit growth came predomi-
nantly from fixed exchange rate regimes, to be more specific from countries op-
erating under formal currency boards (Bulgaria, Estonia or Lithuania), quasi-
currency boards (Latvia, Croatia2). Additionally, having their hands tied in
1Bank of Slovenia provided us only with the Yes/No answers to the tools without stating
the dates of implementation. Given the fact that Slovenia does not fall into the category of
countries that used such policy measures extensively, the response is of valuable significance
nonetheless.
2The de jure and de facto regimes in Croatia differ markedly. National Bank of Croatia
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case of interest rates or exchange rate tools, the countries introduces a rich
record of various prudential and supervisory activities. Most of the measures
were moreover specifically targeted to the key issues of the credit developments,
namely FX-denominated private borrowing often in form of housing loans.
The overall assessment is however mixed. Among the most important rea-
sons for underperformance is the insufficient scrutiny of foreign parent banks.
In particular the main problem was rooted in lack of enforcement capacity and
weak cross-border supervisory cooperation. This argument was permanently
stressed in the literature prior (Hilbers et al. 2005) or after the financial melt-
down (Bakker & Gulde 2010). The lack of supervisory coordination contributed
to creation of loopholes such as shift from FX-lending of local subsidiaries di-
rectly to foreign mothers, or shift to less regulated and supervised non-bank
financial institutions (notably leasing companies) that conducted quasi-bank
activities and fell outside the regulatory horizon. On the top of that, selected
countries experienced also faced persistent issues with domestic yet systemati-
cally important banks (Hungarian OTP Bank or Latvian Parex).
Hypothesis 4.2. Policy measures were mostly reactive rather then proactive or
counter-cyclical.
There has been a substantial criticism regarding the type and timing of
policy responses. Taking the fiscal stance, Bakker & Gulde (2010) emphasized
that with the benefit of hindsight, public expenditure growth should have been
more restrained during the boom years. If the surge in revenues had been used
to build up increasing fiscal surpluses, fiscal policy would not have further fueled
overheating (Bakker & Gulde 2010). Based on the survey results, only Latvia
undertook changes in taxation to discourage lending practices (the change in
taxation was aimed at real estate transaction, see Chapter 5). Notwithstanding
Martin et al. (2009) argued even in the specific case of Latvia, the post-financial
turmoil implementation of the fiscal measures stimulating the economy proved
to be a very complicated task since the government has not accumulated any
reserves in good times.
Evaluation of prudential and monetary stance is more questionable. First
of all, policymakers devoted much effort to design prudential and supervisory
measures get in line with the Western European best practices and Basel II
implements the exchange rate regime of managed floating de jure. However in the light
of highly euroized financial system Croatia operates under de facto quasi-currency board
allowing for exchange rate volatility to discourage one-way gambles and speculation and at
the same time encourage FX hedging.
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requirements. Secondly, the levels of capital buffers were even higher than the
latter listed requirements and practices. The rationale behind a more prudent
stance of particular economies once again stems from the nature of the region
(its relative immaturity, riskiness and and turbulent credit developments).
Moreover, leaning against the wind during good times had at least partially
positive effect (see evaluation of Recommendation S in Poland in Chapter 5, or
detailed assessment of selected Croatian measures performed by Galac 2010).
Since the objective of this thesis is to evaluate the effect on the credit de-
velopments prior to the crisis rather than their counter-cyclical character of
the instruments, there are two main points to consider. First, the reactiveness
character of central authorities stemmed from the wide range of circumvention
practices used by the banks. A few country experiences report shift of activi-
ties to less well-regulated parts of the financial system as a response to more
prudent measures. Consequently, some countries reacted by further measures
to counter the newly emerged adverse issues (broadening of the base for reserve
requirements or extending the supervision).
Second, even when the countries attempted to pro-actively introduce changes
to the potentially dangerous issues, the circumvention was not rare. As a re-
sult, when evaluating the successes of most measures, successes turn out to be
short-lived or we need wider datasets (on not only bank credit but also account
for non-bank data) to correctly asses the issue.
Figure 4.1: Number of policy measures over time in CEE (quarterly
data)
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the time evolution of the measures used in entire CEE
region. The reactiveness of the measures can also by supported by the fre-
quency. In particular, unless facing serious issue most policy responses were
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“late risers”. The peak of policy activities was in second half of 2005 and first
half of 2006. With respect to specific type of responses, we can observe that
monetary measures were used among the first ones. Over time they mostly
reached their limits and authorities turned into more specific prudential and
supervisory tools.
Prudential and supervisory toolkit is particularly rich and offer a wide range
of relevant country lessons. As one can infer from figure 4.1 the measures were
popular until the end of the researched period, i.e. early stage of global financial
crisis. This is also because the measures are not directly powerful for slowing
down the credit boom but they are designed to foster the resiliency of the
banking sector. From this perspective the best scenario would be to achieve a
less pronounced credit growth as a welcome side-effect of more stable financial
system.
Few economies facing the most serious external imbalances also undertook
more controversial direct measures (credit ceilings or capital controls). The
overall amount of such measures does not strictly correspond to the data showed
in Figure 4.1 as all the modifications and amendments to the existing measures
taken in different periods are displayed.
For observed period Croatia witnessed two credit ceiling periods (from Jan-
uary 2003 until the end of the year, from November 2007 until 20093). Next
experiences occurred in Bulgaria (since March 2005 with further adjustments
taken over 2005 and 2006) and Romania (September 2005). In mid-2008 Lithua-
nia also resorted to capital controls.
The timing and the type of responses will be further discussed by splitting
the region the three subgroups as in Chapter 2: Central (CEE-5), Baltic (BE-3)
and Southeastern (SE-3) European economies.
3The credit control was only eliminated in November 2009. The lifting of the tax was
delayed due to fears that removing the tax would give banks room to depreciate the exchange
rate
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4.2 Regional view
4.2.1 Southeastern economies
Figure 4.2: Number of policy measures over time in SE-3 (quarterly
data)
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Group of Southeastern European economies (SE-3) consists of Bulgaria, Ro-
mania and Croatia. All listed countries were particularly active over the en-
tire period by means of implementing wide range of measures to curb the
credit growth. Besides the conventional practices, SE-3 has rich record of non-
conventional measures such as marginal reserve requirements, special reserve
requirement or credit ceilings. This was also because the listed countries faced
substantial capital inflows that strongly influenced the local developments. On
the other hand, by the end of the 2008 these economies were among the first
ones that implemented countermeasures (e.g. relaxation of reserve require-
ments at the end of 2008 in Bulgaria).
The activeness of policymakers rocketed in 2005 and 2006 when measures
taken within SE-3 amounted to 90% of all the measures in CEE region. This
is also why SE-3 can provide useful lessons learned for other not strictly CEE
countries. Interestingly, all three economies have personal experience with
the most evasive instrument, i.e. credit ceilings (see Chapter 5) to curb the
predatory FX lending practices and capital inflows. Anyway, the overall effect
of administrative measure was mostly short-term.
When evaluating the effectiveness of quantitative measures in the SE-3, the
policymakers agree on the long-term effectiveness eroded over time due to many
circumvention practices. Side-effects, evasion techniques and synergies between
domestic subsidiaries and foreign parent banks were often the case. Further-
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more, Romanian authorities add that some credit institutions resorted to the
reconfiguration of key features of their loan offer, trying to dilute the constraints
exercised by the administrative and prudential measures on indebtedness level
of households. On the top of that reduction of the debt service burden at
origination was often altered by increasing the maturity of loans or by using
different promotional offers with reduced rates in the first years of the facility.
4.2.2 Central European economies
Figure 4.3: Number of policy measures over time in CEE-5 (quarterly
data)
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This set is the largest since it includes almost half of the CEE countries
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland). Nonetheless it
is also a set of five countries that showed more neglect towards listed policy
measures. The small rate of active participation is however reasonable provided
the countries did not face large external vulnerabilities connected with the
credit developments.
Based on the analysis of credit excessiveness in Chapter 2, all the countries
but Hungary experienced the least pronounced credit boom especially with
comparison to the rest of the region. As a consequence, the amount of policy
responses can be justifiably smaller.
Furthermore, all the listed tools were of prudential and supervisory nature
and were either aimed at improvement of the resiliency of the banking sector
(especially via capital requirements or non-binding guidelines for banks) or
control of the FX borrowing that could be particularly dangerous if domestic
agents undervalue the FX risks of floating exchange rate regimes.
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The most important intervention is the Recommendation S introduced by
Polish authorities in the third quarter of 2006 which is analyzed in detail in
chapter 5. Yet it is crucial to stress the was originally designed to the specific
problem of high portion of unhedged FX borrowing.
The fact that the economies did not attribute much resources to introduce
measures that would be directly aimed to control for the credit development
allows us to use the countries as control samples in event studies exercises.
Namely, we will work with Czech Republic (entire period) and Slovakia (2003-
2007). At the verge of financial turmoil in October 2008, Slovak authorities
implemented soft measures connected with the introduction of the new liquidity
asset indicator and close daily monitoring of the liquidity indicator. Given the
timing the measures were however mostly linked to a closer management of the
liquidity risk rather than credit boom issues.
The responses in Hungary were also scheduled only to the later phase (since
February 2008). The objective of the measures was more targeted to limit
growth of FX lending. Central authorities introduces complex measures to
account for FX risk in capital requirements and also to improve the risk con-
sciousness of both consumers and financial institutions. The phenomenon of FX
lending became more relevant issue since 2003 when conditions for government-
subsidized mortgages tightened and borrowers opted for FX lending schemes
instead. Provided the measures had been employed earlier, it would have been
possible to analyze their effectiveness. However, given the fact that all of them
occurred in 2008, they coincide with the financial crisis and thus the assessment
of the slowdown cannot be attributed to the measures themselves. Another in-
teresting factor to consider in this region is that even though the economies
operate under the floating exchange rate regimes, the FX risk did not con-
tribute as significantly to the measure responses as in case of economies with
currency pegs.
4.2.3 Baltic economies
In BE-3 we can observe continual shift from monetary instruments to prudential
and supervisory tools. In the late 2007 and early 2008 we can even encounter
two administrative procedures. In the third quarter it is a case of change
in taxation on real estate transactions in as a part of comprehensive Anti-
inflationary plan in Latvia and in mid-2008 it is a case of Lithuanian capital
controls.
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Figure 4.4: Number of policy measures over time in BE-3 (quarterly
data)
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Until 2006, the measures were almost exclusively oriented on either reserve
requirements or capital requirements. The only reported exception is strength-
ening supervision in Latvia in 2004. In the second half of the period (since
2007), policymakers devoted more to specific instruments to curb the real es-
tate growth and real estate related borrowing (Table 4.2). Development of the
real estate sector is identified to be one of the main problems in this regional
context (including overestimation of collateral, predatory lending practices of
foreign banks and overoptimism about the future).
Table 4.2: Survey results - specific policy responses used in BE-3 in
the second half of the period
Measures Frequency
2007 Change in taxes on real estate transactions 1
Limit on LTV 1
Soft measures - new non-binding guidelines for banks 3
FX measures - tighter net open position limits 2
2008 Capital controls 1
Capital requirements (higher/differentiated) or higher risk weights 2
Changes in the required level 1
Limit on LTV 1
Soft measures - new non-binding guidelines for banks 1
Tighter provisioning rules 1
Tighter supervision 1
Total 25
Even though the structure of the economies is fairly similar, the scale and
responses very much differ form each other. On one hand we can see Latvia as
the most active player (see also specific country experience of Anti-inflationary
plan in Chapter 5). On the other hand, Estonia implemented only limited
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amount measures and what is more relatively market-friendly. Hence we will
also use Estonian case as a control country to discuss the measures taken else-
where in the BE-3.
4.3 The most popular measures
Table 4.3: Frequency of the measures used
Total Amount of
frequency countries
Interest rate response N/A * 3
Reserve requirements 12 ** 5
Capital requirements (higher/differentiated) or higher risk weights 12 8
Liquid asset requirements (introduction/tightening) 3 3
Tighter asset classification rules 3 2
Tighter provisioning rules 3 3
Tighter eligibility criteria for certain loans (via LTV, LTI etc.) 5 3
Tighter rules on valuation criteria 1 1
Measures targeted on FX borrowing 5 5
Soft measures - new non-binding guidelines for banks 13 9
Tighter supervision 7 4
Capital controls 1 1
Credit ceilings 4 *** 3
Change in taxes on real estate transactions 1 1
* Even though the interest rates measures were common, the frequency of implementation
for credit growth slowdown purposes is uncertain (see Box 4.5).
** Twelve regular RR plus five additional MRR and one SRR in case of Croatia.
*** Four independent credit ceilings plus three additional extensions or adjustments of MRR
in case of Bulgaria.
4.3.1 Soft measures
Undoubtedly the survey reveals soft measures to be of the highest popularity.
Nine out of eleven countries issued non-binding guidelines for the banks at least
once over the years 2003-08. Moreover, many countries continued with moral
suasion and soft measures targeted at domestic consumers.
From the time aspect, all the guidelines were introduces in the later part
of the period (2006-2008). Majority of them was concerned with proposing
more prudent risk assessment and lending practices with special attention to
FX lending. Their main objective was to stimulate banks to adopt new polices
and procedures to identify, monitor and control especially the credit and FX
risks of the borrowers.
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In some cases the measures were taken also in form of more binding guide-
lines (strengthening of the supervision). For illustration, a recommendation
issued by Bulgarian authorities urged banks not to extend credit to households
subject to threshold value of disposable income in 2006 when non-adherence to
the recommendation could result in additional supervisory measures.
Soft measures were also effectively combined with other instruments such
as in Polish Recommendation S. Alternatively, the non-binding guidelines were
also often succeeded by tighter supervisory rules. However, the evaluation of
the measures is not very positive. Estonia, that engaged in moral suasion for
the entire period, admits the credit expansion continues nonetheless. Hungar-
ian attempted to improve customer consciousness about the underlying risks
neither managed to achieve any palpable results. On the top that, since the
measures mostly occurred in the last phase, majority of their effects are hard
to distinguish from the impact of the crisis.
4.3.2 Capital requirements and risk weights
Modification of capital requirements is considered to be the second most pop-
ular policy option. However in this respect we need to be very careful since
the researched period covers the time span within which the countries were to
adopt the Basel II requirements. This fact can be potentially reflected in the
“popularity of the measure” as well. Since this thesis does not deal with the
issue of the impact of Basel II, we will concentrate of other modifications of
the capital requirements namely those taken predominantly to curb the credit
growth. Still, it is viable to stress that that most of the economies still kept
the capital adequacy ratio well above 8%.
Furthermore, the survey results also clearly state the vast majority was
more concerned with adjustment of the risk weights. Higher risk weights were
widely applied to two cases: real-estate related loans and FX loans.
The first measure was applied in countries facing real estate booms along
with credit booms (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria). Weights for
real-estate related loans were sometime raised to the amount of 100%. The
measures were mostly targeted at mortgages of households or/and commercial
property. In Bulgaria they went hand in hand with tighter eligibility criteria
(limits on LTV was lowered from 70% to 50%.
The latter measure was also popular in case of real estate booms since the
largest portion of private FX loans were taken in form of mortgages. For exam-
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ple, in 2008 Hungarian capital requirements were increased for loans denomi-
nated in Japanese Yen under Pillar 2 of Basel II. On the other hand, Croatia
required extra capital buffers to be created for loans to unhedged borrowers.
Prior to Basel II Croatia required higher risk weights for loans to unfledged
borrowers (originally set at 25%, later increased to 50%). Later, in 2006 it in-
troduces guidelines to banks on management of foreign currency induces credit
risk (FCICR).
Figure 4.5: Box - Interest rate deadlock
Even though interest rate increases were common during the researched period,
none of the central banks applied them with respect to the credit boom. For
illustration based on the survey results, National Bank of Poland changed key
policy rates a number of times in order to balance the risk of inflation. Al-
though credit developments contributed to the the inflation outlook, it cannot
be concluded that interest rate changes were specifically targeted to fight the
credit growth.
Furthermore, many central banks identifies a number of undesirable side effects
of interest rates tightening:
(a) Transition problem Many economies witnessed increasing competition but
still relatively ample profit margins for financial institutions. Banks were
willing to absorb higher funding costs (associated often with conventional
monetary policy measures) without affecting the lending costs.
(b) Exchange rate framework Countries experiencing the most pronounced
credit boom were constraint by currency peg to euro (Baltic states, Bul-
garia).
(c) Foreign ownership of banks allowed banks to obtain financing from parent
banks. Lending standards were in line with home conditions (relevant
mainly for Baltic countries).
(d) FX borrowing, as one of the most risky drivers of credit boom, would not
only remain unaffected but in case of significant interest rate differentials
would be even spurred by the domestic rate tightening.
(e) Already high capital inflows would under rising interest rates increase even
further while credit growth response was uncertain (fear in Croatia given
the past experience of Serbia).
(f) Low initial level of household debt was often the case. Experience of Latvia
in 2003-05 showed that even thought interest rates were implemented the
financial deepening persisted.
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4.3.3 Reserve requirements
Four out of eleven central banks resorted to tightening of reserve requirements
to dampen the effect of credit boom: Romania (2004-2005), Croatia (2004-06),
Estonia (2006) and Latvia (2004-06). Interestingly, all the changes occurred in
the first half of the researched period, suggesting that RR could have been one
of the first measures tried. As the credit development data imply, the boom
did neither not stop nor slow down in 2006 hence the overall effectiveness is
questionable. Thus the questions emerge: Why was the timing so consistent
among the countries? Were the measures consistent across the region as well?
What were the channels of circumvention?
The time consistency issue may lie in relative simplicity of implementation.
Moreover RR fall into the category of conventional monetary tools. This very
argument also justifies the sudden stop of RR tightening: levels in CEE region
were well above average level in euro area and their efficiency was limited by
shifting more upwards. For illustration, standard RR on liabilities denominated
in domestic currency were set as high as 18% in Romania and Croatia or 15% in
Estonia. Nonetheless, the overall quantitative constraint was not the strongest
nor the most popular measure.
The rationale behind is that most dangerous was not the pace of credit
growth per se but the underlying currency and maturity mismatches. As a
result, central authorities decided to act by broadening the reserve base (Latvia
in 2005 and 2006, Romania twice in 2005), differentiation by type of deposit
(Latvia in 2005 and 2006) and differentiation by the currency (Romania 2004
and 2006).
Croatian experience is particularly interesting as the authority actually low-
ered the minimum required reserve ratio multiple times over the researched
period (counter-measures) while introducing new measures marginal reserve
requirements (MRR) and special reserve requirements (SRR). Although both
MRR and RR differentiated by the currency have the same goal (to control the
excessive FX-denominated borrowing), the contrast is in the marginal character
of MRR (call for additional requirements only to the increment of FX liabili-
ties). Nevertheless, the further modification were again feasible - broadening
of the base, change of the reference period etc. On the other hand, SRR were
introduced only once (at the late stage of MRR application) and they called
for special requirements of 55% on liabilities arising from issued securities. Yet
again, they were also differentiated by the currency.
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Table 4.4: Reserve requirements
Country Type Measure Date Details
Croatia RR Changes in the required level 2004-10 Decrease to 18%
Croatia RR Changes in the required level 2005-12 Decrease from 18% to 17%
Croatia RR Changes in the required level 2008-11 Decrease from 17% to 14%
Croatia MRR New measure 2004-07 MRR at 24 %, reference period: 2004-07
Croatia MRR Changes in the required level 2005-02 From 24% to 30%
Croatia MRR Changes in the required level 2005-05 From 30% to 40%
Croatia MRR Reference period 2005-11 Upgraded reference period: 2005-11
Croatia MRR Broaden the reserve base 2006-01 MRR at 55%, extended base (to include
guarantees and other investments kept
off balance sheet)
Croatia SRR New measure 2006-02 SRR at 55% on introduced on liabilities
arising from issued securities, reference
period: 2006. Calculated separately for
FX and domestic currency
Croatia MRR Broaden the reserve base 2006-06 Extended base (to include increases in
funds received from nonresidents and le-
gal persons in a special relationship with
a bank which are used to finance do-
mestic entities in the form of syndicated
loans or in the name and for the account
of the mandated operations)
Estonia RR Changes in the required level 2006-09 Decrease from 13% to 15%
Latvia RR Changes in the required level 2004-07 From 3% to 4%
Latvia RR Broaden the reserve base 2005-01 Liabilities to foreign banks and foreign
central banks included
Latvia RR Changes in the required level 2005-08 From 4% to 6%
Latvia RR Changes in the required level 2005-12 From 6% to 8%
Latvia RR Broaden the reserve base 2006-05 Liabilities with maturity more than 2
years included
Latvia RR Changes in the required level 2008-02 If maturity more than 2 years RR from
8% to 7%, otherwise RR remained 8%.
Romania RR Differentiated by currency 2005-02 FX-denominated from 25% to 30%,
RON-denominated remained at 18%
Romania RR Broaden the reserve base 2005-02 RR on FX broadened to included all li-
abilities irrespective of maturity
Romania RR Broaden the reserve base 2005-07
Romania RR Differentiated by currency 2006-03 FX-denominated from 30% to 40%
The outcome of various RR measures did not fulfill the expectations. On
the plus side, Hilbers et al. (2005) acknowledged that in case of Estonia the
term structure of FX borrowings improved. The overall effectiveness of RR was
short-lived as domestic players quickly adapted to new constraints. Domestic
subsidiaries externalized part of FX loan portfolios to balance sheets of foreign
parent banks or the subsidiaries operated as their agent (in case of corporate
clients).
Furthermore, activities were often shifted to the less regulated sector of leas-
ing companies. Banks also started to engage in asset swaps, collateralization,
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accelerated NPL write-offs (Hilbers et al. 2005). All of this, adversely affected
data transparency. As central authorities reacted to these efforts by broadening
the reserve base, local agents found new ways of circumventions.
4.3.4 Measures targeted on FX borrowing
As has been already discussed many of the listed tools were aimed at inhibiting
FX borrowing (special weights on capital requirements, targeted non-binding
guidelines or reserve requirement differentiated by the currency). Additionally,
the survey further requested central banks to provide an information whether
there introduced more measured targeted on FX borrowing mainly by targeting
unhedged borrowers or tighter net open positions.
Altogether five countries adopted one of the listed measures. The experi-
ence is fairly rich as it covers all the sub-regions: Poland (CEE-5), Latvia and
Lithuania (BE-3) and Croatia and Romania (SE-3).
The overall evaluation is again mixed. The measures mostly managed to
cut the FX lending practices of the subsidiary banks. However, in some cases
banks only shifted their activities directly to the parent banks. On the other
hand, the case of Poland illustrates a success since the measures helped to shift
foreign currency lending to domestic currency lending that is easier to manage
in terms of conventional policy tools especially and poses less risks especially
in floating exchange rate regime framework. Two different experiences Poland
and Latvia are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5
Selected country experiences
5.1 Methodology of Difference-in-differences
Difference-in-differences (DID) allows to “experiment” on real (non-experimental)
data. DID tries to find a naturally occurring comparison group that could mimic
the properties of the control group in the properly designed experimental con-
text (Blundell & Costa Dias 2000). In our case the series of non-experimental
data is the private credit growth in countries of CEE region. Since not all the
countries intervened against credit growth the dataset of eleven countries can
be divided into two groups: control and treated countries.
Let us start by introducing the basic terminology. We define the event as a
month and a year when the central authority applied a measure to control the
credit growth. Event window is either twelve or six months depending on the
frequency of measures used by the central banks.
Time series are credit to private sector obtained from IFS IMF database
(recalculated into annual growth rates). When needed, we further work with
specific data on only housing loans or credit differentiated subject to currency
(FX-denominated loans, domestic currency denominated loans).
Success of a measure is the most challenging issue. Given a pronounced
credit boom, it is unlikely that direction criterion (change from credit increase
to credit decrease) would be of much help. Hence the success is judged by the
smoothing criterion, i.e. measure led to small credit growth compared to a
preceding period:
∆Yi,t=0 > ∆Yi,t=1 (5.1)
Furthermore, the success is justified on a country comparison based on
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difference-in-differences estimator. The basic DID framework can be described
as follows:
Yi,t = δt + αDi,t + ηi + νi,t (5.2)
where Yi,t is a credit growth of country i at time t. We split the researched
period t into two parts: pre-treatment period (t = 0) and post-treatment period
(t = 1). In the pre-treatment period none of the countries intervened against
the credit growth and we may assume they were following the parallel paths.
Then, a measures is put into practice. We denote control country as Di,1 = 0
as a country that did not apply any explicit measures to alleviate the credit
growth. Treated country is denoted as Di,1 = 1. To summarize:
Di,t =
1 treated group in post-treatment period (t=1)0 otherwise.
Furthermore in equation 5.2 α stands for the impact of treatment. δt rep-
resents time specific component (e.g. common macro effect shared by all coun-
tries), ηi country-specific component constant over time and νi,t is temporary
country-specific component that has zero mean at each period.
Given our analysis, not all the variables are observable. As a consequence,
in line with Blundell & Costa Dias (2000) we define Ui,t as unobservable com-
ponent:
Ui,t = δt + ηi + νi,t (5.3)
The crucial assumption is that unobservables for both treated and controls
are same in first differences:
E[Ui,1 − Ui,0 | Di,1 = 1] = E[Ui,1 − Ui,0 | Di,1 = 0] = E[Ui,1 − Ui,0] (5.4)
The DID estimator can be then denoted as:
αˆ = {E[Yi,1 | Di,1 = 1]− E[Yi,1 | Di,1 = 0]}−
{E[Yi,0 | Di,1 = 1]− E[Yi,0 | Di,1 = 0]} (5.5)
Given the potential drawbacks connected with of the unobservables espe-
cially as we acknowledge the transition character of all the economies in ques-
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tion (see also discussion of reasons for out-of-sample analysis in Chapter 2).
That is why the main weakness of the DID lies in specific country constants ηi.
Hence, if the country selection permits, we will work with two control coun-
tries rather than one. The selection of control values is undermined by foreign
currency regime and relative proximity of the economies. In case of Baltic
countries, Estonia will be used as control country. 1 As for the floating ER
regimes, we select two countries: Czech Republic (entire period) and Slovakia
(2003-2007).2
This will thus allow us to construct two DID estimators that can work as a
benchmark values and to some extent weaken the effect of one country specific
ηi.
Yet, we still recognize further potential drawbacks of the event studies.
Therefore, we will not judge the measures purely subject to the DID estimators.
For instance, one particular problem may be rooted in the adverse selection
of the countries resorting to policy measures. Since any of the listed measures
bear costs and distortion, it is quite natural to expect that only countries facing
serious issues would exercise them. The selection process can be formulated:
Di,1 =
1 Yi,t−k + Ui,t > Z¯0 otherwise
where Z¯ stands for an excessive level of credit growth. Yi,t−k represent the
credit growth in recent period (k is positive integer). Yet again, the estimation
of excessiveness of credit growth is a demanding issue itself (see Chapter 2).
5.2 Recommendation S - case of Poland
In July 2006, Poland applied the Recommendation S to address the issue of
large share of housing loans denominated in FX currency. Recommendation S
combined measures targeted at FX borrowing (namely by targeting unhedged
households) and non-binding guidelines for banks. The measure called banks
to both assess and inform customers about FX risks. Among others, banks
were to evaluate the ability of borrowers to repay FX loans in case of 20%
1In 2006, Estonia resorted to new procedures in reserve requirements and capital weight.
Moral suasion persistently occurred over the entire period. The capital weights were adjusted
so that they are in line with Basel II standards
2In 2008 Slovak central authorities implemented tools against the credit growth.
5. Selected country experiences 56
depreciation od the zloty and interest rate at least equal to the level of the
zloty interest rate when granting the FX loans (NBP 2007).
Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 illustrate the development of annual private credit
growth before and after the application of Recommendation S. We work with
the period of 13 months before and 13 months after the July 2006 (June 2005 to
July 2007)3. The comparison is based on two possible credit growth rate: an-
nual credit growth rate as of June 2006 as pre-treatment and as of July 2007 as
post-treatment (case A). We also construct a geometric mean of specific annual
credit growth rates measured over the period (case B). Geometric means may
include additional information for an entire development in the pre-period or
post-period. In both cases the periods are compared and differences estimated.
Here DID can applied on two controls: as neither Czech Republic nor Slovakia
attempted to use any measures.
Table 5.1: DID - Case of Polish Recommendation S
Case A: Annual credit growth rates as of 2006-06 and 2007-07
Treated PL Controls CZ Controls SK PL− CZ PL− SK
t=0 0.158 0.213 0.276 -0.055 -0.118
t=1 0.305 0.244 0.198 0.060 0.107
Difference 0.147 0.031 -0.078 0.116 0.225
Case B: Geometric mean of annual credit growth rates of every month
Treated PL Controls CZ Controls SK PL− CZ PL− SK
t=0 0.075 0.200 0.243 -0.125 -0.169
t=1 0.241 0.222 0,224 0.019 0.017
Difference 0.167 0.023 -0.019 0.144 0.186
Notes
Start End Start End
t=0 2005-06 2006-06 t=1 2006-07 2007-07
The figure 5.1 implies that the measures did not manage to slow down the
boom but rather the other way round. However, in order to get more specific
results we need to look at the target group of loans: FX-denominated housing
loans. According to the figure 5.2 Recommendation S may have be efficient
in slowing down the FX-denominated housing loans for the sake of increasing
zloty-denominated lending.
3Within an event window, in April 2007, Poland adjusted the capital requirements which
may be a source of further bias. However, as we discuss the overall private credit is not the
best approach and when analyzing FX-denominated housing loans the capital adequacy did
not have a major effect.
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Figure 5.1: Effect of Recommendation S on credit dynamics - Case B
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Figure 5.2: Effect of Recommendation S: Currency decomposition
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Source: National Bank of Poland (Growth rate of housing loans to households, data adjusted
for exchange rates differences)
This conclusion is also in line with National Bank of Poland that also
stresses the mixed effect of the tool. On plus side, it appears that the Recom-
mendation was successful in rising the public awareness of FX risks stemmed
from underlying fluctuation of the zloty exchange rate and interest rates which
is why the central authority managed to cut the FX lending (Figure 5.3 illus-
trates the overall development of FX housing loans).
On the minus side, the credit growth continued to rise (even at faster pace).
The justification is that the banks adapted to the measure by easing credit
standards (e.g. easing eligibility criteria by means of LTV or LTI or extending
maturities). The measure could have been even more effective since National
Bank of Poland admits that such circumvention took place also for FX loans
(NBP 2007). To conclude, in this case the risk arising from foreign currency
exposures was transferred to some extent into credit risk.
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Figure 5.3: Share of FX loans in moving averages of amounts of
growth of housing loans to HH (adjusted for exchange
rate differences)
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5.3 Anti-inflationary plan - case of Latvia
In July 2007, Latvia introduced a new regulation to contain excessive real
estate related credit boom. The measure named Anti-inflationary plan (or
Economic stabilization plan) was targeted at both banks and real estate buyers.
The toolkit included a set of comprehensive requirements, including limits on
LTV and changes in taxes on real estate transactions. The minimum amount
of initial down payment on real estate purchases was set at 10% while the
limit on LTV of mortgage-backed credit at 90%. Stricter valuation criteria
were also placed with respect to income situation of the borrowers - in case
of loans in excess of 100 minimum monthly wages, statement of legal income
was made compulsory. Furthermore, real estate stamp duty was increased
and amendments to the Personal Income Law posed further requirements on
speculative demand4 (Latvijas Banka 2007).
The measures were to promote a gradual correction in real estate (mainly
housing) market. The DID results of the developlments of housing loans prior
and after the implementation of Anti-inflationary plan are illustrated in Table
5.2 and Figure 5.4. The event window ranges from January 2007 to January
2008, i.e. half a year before and after the event occurred. DID results report
slowdown of the housing lending developments, hence success of the measure
(the pace of credit housing loan growth in treated Latvia slowed down more that
4The revised law claimed that upon selling a real estate registered with the Land Register
after 12 June 2007, the income tax must amount to 25% of the difference between the property
purchase and sales prices. It is to be collected in the case of the respective property having
been held by the seller for less than 60 months after its registration with the Land Register
(Latvijas Banka 2007).
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in case of control country Estonia). Since housing loans amount to significant
percentage of the private credit, the same conclusion can be applied for overall
credit developments (Figure 5.5).
Table 5.2: DID - Anti-inflationary plan in Latvia - effect on housing
loans
Case A: Annual credit growth rates as of 2007-06 and 2008-01
Treated LV Controls EE LV - EE
t=0 0.809 0.518 0.292
t=1 0.398 0.292 0.106
Difference -0.411 -0.226 -0.185
Case B: Geometric mean of annual credit growth rates of every month
Treated LV Controls EE LV - EE
t=0 0.863 0.573 0.291
t=1 0.556 0.381 0.175
Difference -0.307 -0.192 -0.116
Notes
Start End
t=0 2007-01 2007-06
t=1 2007-07 2008-01
Figure 5.4: Anti-inflationary plan in Latvia - effect on housing loans
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Notwithstanding, this time period should be treated with caution: in the
first part of 2007, Latvia also introduced soft measures and by tightening net
open positions (See Box 5.6). Post-treatment period is not directly affected
by any measures (next interventions occurred in January 2008 and raised risk
weighting for mortgages in commercial property). However, the overall assess-
ment of Anti-inflationary plan is rather difficult as the it coincides with the
early stage of global financial crisis.
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Figure 5.5: Anti-inflationary plan - total credit growth
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Figure 5.6: Box - Latvian new open foreign currency posi-
tion calculation in 2007
Based on the survey responses, the Bank of Latvia (Latvijas Banka) reported
changes in new open positions as a measure that can potentially help to control
the FX lending in April 2007.
The Financial and Capital Market Commission of Latvia amended the Regula-
tion for Calculating Capital Adequacy (effective as of May 2007). The threshold
of net open position in euro was as set to 10% relative to own funds. As a re-
sult, open FX position of the banks fell from 15.5% (relative to own funds) at
the beginning of the year to 3.2% at the end of the year (Latvijas Banka 2007).
Analogous measure was canceled earlier in 2005. Between January 2005 and
April/May 2007, euro was excluded from the calculations of open currency
positions since the adoption of euro was originally scheduled for 2008.
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Figure represents evolution of euro-denominated borrowing in Latvia differen-
tiated by the currency. Lines indicate changes in euro classification in/out of
the calculation of open currency position.
The developments had a dampening effect of real estate credit dynamics.
Martin et al. (2009) argue that raised funding costs, lack of confidence and
limited resource availability in the global financial markets adversely affected
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the Latvian banking sector, resulting in more conservative lending standards
of Latvian banks. Latvijas Banka (2007) reported the drop in demand and
consequent fall of real estate prices. Simultaneously, by tightened lending stan-
dards and banks also constrained financing of new projects of developers. One
of the reported means of circumventions was an attempt to boost the demand
via various discount offers and bonuses that however did not prove particularly
successful. The corrections in the real estate market and a contraction of do-
mestic demand materialized however the contribution of Anti-inflationary plan
at the eve of financial turmoil is hard to assess separately.
5.4 Credit ceilings in SE-3
All three countries falling into the category of SE-3 sought to set administrative
measures to control the credit boom. In this part we attempt to look into
detail of four credit ceiling experiences: Croatia (January 2003, January 2007),
Romania (September 2005) and Bulgaria (March 2005)5.
The case of credit ceilings unfortunately cannot be evaluated via proposed
DID methodology as the main assumptions are not in order. Firstly, unlike
Poland or Latvia we cannot select a control country that would have corre-
spondent path of credit developments. Secondly, all three countries were very
active by means of policy measures and hence the event window cannot be
selected properly.
Nonetheless, there are other points to consider: credit ceilings are the
strongest, most directed and quantitatively most restrictive approach to con-
trol the credit growth. The countries implemented four variously defined credit
controls over a long period of time (first ceiling being implemented in 2003 and
last being removed in 2009).
As a result we attempt to look at the credit ceilings from different perspec-
tive. First, we let us denote time t = 0 as a time of implementation of the
restriction for each country. Then we denote t = −n as a time n months prior
to the credit growth and t = +n analogously. For the sake of simplicity we
will start looking at the credit changes before and after event date (we assume
all measures started at t = 0 irrespective of actual time). Due to the hight in-
tensity of measures we will work with two different event windows: 12 months
5The date in parenthesis indicate the year of implementation.
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and 6 months. We derive the differences in pre-treatment and post-treatment
period for every country (see table B.2) and plot the basic figures (figure 5.7).
Figure 5.7: Credit developments prior and after the credit ceilings
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Results of both event windows are consistent, albeit we can observe higher
the dynamics over longer period. Extending windows to even larger time span
would not make much sense since the first credit ceiling of 2003 in Croatia was
removed after one year and the last Croatian credit ceiling coincides with the
financial crisis.
What can be inferred from the results? The country with the highest credit
dynamics prior to credit ceilings (Bulgaria) was the most successful in curbing
the growth at least in the short-term period. Shortly after March 2005 im-
plementation of credit ceilings, quarterly limits on the penalty-free growth of
credit were extended beyond the originally one-year planned period until the
end of 2006. Consequently, the MRR (penalty rates) were temporarily risen
subject to the size of “crossing the speed limit”. When banks exceeded the
ceiling by 1-2%, MRR were increased from 200% to 300%. When breaking the
limit by more than 2% MRR were set to 400% . This amendment was however
only of temporary character (May 2006 - August 2006).
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Figure 5.8: Credit ceilings and MRR in Croatia
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Results may suggest that two Croatian credit experiences were fairly alike.
Yet, the design of 2007 was performed more carefully than the early credit
controls and is along with other prudential tools considered to achieve more
success (IMF 2010). The first era of credit ceilings in Croatia is often referred
as “the 16% rule” as the tool urged bank lending to grow be less that 4% per
quarter (16% per annum). Otherwise banks were obliged to by low-interest
HNB bills at penalty rates twice as high as the excess credit.
Such a speed limit did contribute to some deceleration namely in case of
household lending (see Figure 5.8 that did not have at the time a good access to
direct FX borrowing alternative. The Figure also suggests a fall in corporate
loans, these were however substituted by direct FX borrowing from parent
banks, a very popular channel of circumvention. In conclusion, local banks
adjusted to the new limits by shifting the activities to either mother banks or
less-supervised affiliated leasing companies. Since 2004 this measure was hence
discontinued and replace by series of marginal reserve requirements.
The second era of credit ceilings was built upon the lessons learned from
“the 16% rule” of 2003. In particular, it covered selling of credit portfolio and
credit risk. Loans of affiliates were also covered in the allowed speed limit
which was set at 12% annual credit growth. In other words, if banks exceed
12% annual credit growth, they were to purchase HNB bills. The results are
quite favorable but corresponding to the “the 16% rule”: housing loans were
managed to put under control and corporate credit remained high thanks to
direct borrowing.
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Romanian controls were aimed at limiting FX credit exposure of unhedged
borrowers: total loans were not allowed to exceed 300% limit of own funds
(in other words a limit on DTI). Based on our the results the experience of
Romania was not successful (the credit growth continued to rise even at higher
pace).
This conclusion is also in line with overall evaluation of Romanian measures
by Popa (2007) and National Bank of Romania (survey response). They both
acknowledge that quantitative constraints despite producing short term effects
were not able to slow down the lending at its full. Popa (2007) also emphasizes
that the measure was aimed to constrained the activities of more risk preferring
credit institutions (wider range than banking system exposure). That is also
why he admits that most of these institutions preferred to raise their capital
endowment rather than restructure and lower the credit portfolios.
Figure 5.9: Credit ceilings and and currency differentiation in Roma-
nia
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Figure 5.9 provides more concise effect of credit ceilings in September 2009.
The result resembles the case of Poland: FX-denominated lending was low-
ered for the sake shift hike of domestic loans. Based on the data, even though
the credit growth was not curbed, the FX restrictions were effective as they
channeled credit to domestic loans that are easier to manage by means of con-
ventional policy tools. Nonetheless, the circumvention via direct FX borrowing
from foreign mother banks still remains an issue.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Within eleven CEE countries we are able to identify various paths of credit
development and degrees of interventions to the dampen its dynamics.
Based on the panel data FE OLS model we compared the actual private
credit development with the derived long-run equilibrium level. The findings
suggest that all countries witnessed uprising trend of private credit in the pe-
riod of 2003-08. Moreover, all the economies already reached the long-term
equilibrium at least by the upper estimate of derived oscillation range. Our
calculations further predict that five out of eleven economies fully crossed the
long-run equilibrium, implying that their private credit can be considered as
excessive.
Rapid credit growth poses many risks to the financial stability. Hence, we
performed a survey across the central banks in the region aimed at identification
of the behavior of policymakers to the credit boom. The survey consisted of
three main issues: a) monetary policy measures, b) prudential and supervisory
measures, and c) administrative and other administrative measures.
The main conclusions are as follows. First, exchange rate framework played
a crucial role both in scale and scope of the responses. The fears about the
excessiveness of the credit growth originated mainly in fixed exchange regimes.
Having their hand tied in case of interest rate or exchange rate tools, countries
introduced a wide scale of prudential, supervisory and administrative measures.
Yet the effectiveness of the measures with respect to the credit slowdown was
often fairly limited and short-lived as banks and local agents quickly found a
new way of circumvention. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that specific pru-
dential tools may have contributed to fostering the resiliency of the financial
sector per se. On the other hand, flexible exchange rate regimes did not face
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as dramatic a credit evolution. However, countries still attempted to correct
for maturity or currency mismatches.
Second, excessive FX borrowing was very often the main target of the policy
measures. Unfortunately, the success was rare due to a number of circumven-
tion practices. Among others, the most common circumvention was to switch
to direct cross-border borrowing from the foreign parent banks or to shift to
less supervised channels such as leasing companies. The cross-border borrow-
ing did not only substantially limit the effectiveness of the measures but it also
introduces more distortions as the system did not respond appropriately to
the conventional measures such as interest rates or reserve requirements. As a
result we strongly argue that design of the policy tool must reflect domestic en-
vironment and position of the foreign banks to help alleviate the risks entailed
in the credit growth.
Third, last chapter of the thesis was dedicated to the difference-in-differences
(DID) estimations to study the impact of policy measures. Based on the survey
results we were able to find matching control and treated countries to observe
the effect of a policy intervention. The DID illustrate results of mixed successes
due to the wide-spread circumvention practices.
In total we obtained 82 specific policy measures implemented separately
or as a policy mix. This is an extremely rich record given the amount of
economies and the time span. Unfortunately, since majority of the measures
were implemented in the late phase, they coincide with the financial crisis and
hence their contribution to the slowdown is very hard to assess.
In this thesis we discussed the policy responses via survey results and con-
cise event studies for particular cases. Our planned future research should look
into policy measures in greater dept. Furthermore, it would be also interest-
ing to extent the period of the research behind the eve of the financial crisis
and evaluate its effect of the policy toolkits. In addition, CEE lessons have a
lot to offer not only to the region but also as a contribution to the ongoing
macroprudential debate.
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Appendix A
Credit growth dynamics
Having panel macro data for last 25 years, the potential non-stationarity may
a concern. Therefore, set of unit root tests was applied: Levin et al. (2002),
Im et al. (2003) and Breitung (2000). The first and the latter tests assume
all panels to contain unit roots while Im et al. (2003) allows for heterogenity
among panels. Table A.1 provides test results on levels and table A.2 reports
test results on the first differences. The results imply the most series to be I(1)
processes, but in some cases there are conflicting results among tests on level
data. Nonetheless, there is no conflict in test results on the first difference and
we can conclude the data to be I(1) processes. This result is also in accordance
with original model E´gert et al. (2006).
Table A.1: Unit root tests for panel data - levels
Levin-Lin-Chu Im-Pesaran-Shin Breitung
Variable t-statistics p-value t-statistics p-value lambda p-value
cp 5.3344 1.0000 7.0470 1.0000 5.5576 1.0000
capita 14.7536 1.0000 -28.0145 0.0000 3.6313 0.9999
cg 2.5503 0.9946 1.8193 0.9656 1.0452 0.8520
i lending 0.8838 0.8116 7.0061 1.0000 2.9216 0.9983
p ppi -6.4290 0.0000 -4.9299 0.0000 -1.0312 0.1512
spread 0.9293 0.8236 2.7683 0.9972 2.7262 0.9968
Levin-Lin-Chu: and Breitung: Im-Pesaran-Shin:
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: Panels are stationary Ha: Some panels are stationary
Next the cointegration was tested. As we use the model to derive long-
term relationship between private credit-to-GDP and all the listed explanatory
variables, we need the data to be cointegrated. For this very purpose we first
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Table A.2: Unit root tests for panel data - first differences
Levin-Lin-Chu Im-Pesaran-Shin Breitung
Variable t-statistics p-value t-statistics p-value lambda p-value
d cp -11.2685 0.0000 -22.9737 0.0000 -17.2293 0.0000
d capita -12.6788 0.0000 -33.6960 0.0000 1.7430 0.9593
d cg -17.1150 0.0000 -25.5869 0.0000 -15.5816 0.0000
d i lending -12.4102 0.0000 -17.9390 0.0000 -10.4592 0.0000
d p ppi -12.1525 0.0000 -17.7035 0.0000 -11.5653 0.0000
d spread -12.6140 0.0000 -20.8484 0.0000 -12.2918 0.0000
Levin-Lin-Chu: and Breitung: Im-Pesaran-Shin:
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: Panels are stationary Ha: Some panels are stationary
tried to apply the Westerlund & Persyn (2008) error-correction/cointegration
test that implements the four panel cointegration tests. However, it requires
that the country series do not have any gaps which is not valid for two countries
in our dataset.
As a result, we followed the cointegration tests described by E´gert et al.
(2006): applying the pooled mean group estimator (PMGE) suggested by and
using the error correction term ρ as test for cointegration. A negative and sta-
tistically significant error correction term is takes as evidence for the presence
of cointegration (E´gert et al. 2006). According to the results illustrated in table
A.3 the error correction term is estimated as fulfills the double criteria.
Table A.3: Estimation results : PMGE
CP=f(CAPITA,CG,ilending,pPPI,spread)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
ρ -0.056 (0.012) ***
cg -0.197 (0.041) ***
capita 1.055 (0.187) ***
i lending 0.132 (0.059) ***
p ppi 1.182 (0.535) ***
spread -0.115 (0.060) **
Appendix B
DID results
Table B.1: DID - Anti-inflationary plan
Case A: Annual credit growth rates as of 2007-06 and 2008-01
Treated LV Controls EE LV - EE
t=0 0.561 0.367 0.194
t=1 0.316 0.298 0.018
Difference -0.245 -0.069 -0.176
Case B: Geometric mean of annual credit growth rates of every month
Treated LV Controls EE LV - EE
t=0 0.581 0.395 0.186
t=1 0.411 0.373 0.038
Differences -0.170 -0.022 -0.147
Notes
Start End
t=0 2007-01 2007-06
t=1 2007-07 2008-01
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Table B.2: Capital ceilings in SE-3
One Year window
Case A: Geom. mean of annual credit growth rates observed monthly
Start End Croatia 2003 Croatia 2007 Romania Bulgaria
t=0 t-12 t-1 0.260 0.220 0.415 0.496
t=1 t t+11 0.228 0.197 0.535 0.390
Difference -0.033 -0.024 0.120 -0.105
Case: B Annual credit growth rates as of t-1 and t+11
Start End Croatia 2003 Croatia 2007 Romania Bulgaria
t=0 t-12 t-1 0.305 0.229 0.416 0.474
t=1 t t+11 0.151 0.151 0.587 0.289
Difference -0.154 -0.078 0.171 -0.185
Half a year window
Geometric mean of annual credit growth rates observed in every month
Start End Croatia 2003 Croatia 2007 Romania Bulgaria
t=0 t-12 t-1 0.280 0.226 0.401 0.482
t=1 t t+11 0.285 0.222 0.502 0.471
Difference 0.006 -0.004 0.101 -0.012
